

# THE RUSSIAN REVIEW



*An American Quarterly  
Devoted to Russia  
Past and Present*

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# THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

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The aim of "The Russian Review" is to present a non-partisan interpretation of Russian history, civilization, and culture. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article in this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

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# Russian Liberalism

BY ARIADNA TYRKOVA-WILLIAMS

NOT before 1905 were Russian liberals given a chance to organize a liberal party. As an ideological movement, however, liberalism had come to Russia from the West as early as the second half of the eighteenth century. The rich and multiform Russian culture of the nineteenth century evolved under the banner of liberalism and humanism.

This trend began during the reign of Catherine the Great who made the attempt to apply the political ideas of her beloved Montesquieu to her vast and backward realm. The task proved beyond her power; nevertheless, *The Spirit of Laws* helped her to become a truly enlightened ruler. Since that time, the Western-European concepts of the state, the rights of the individual, the needs of the people, took ever stronger hold of Russian minds. The ferment of these ideas affected first the court nobility and the officers of the Guards—the most educated social group of that time. Gradually this circle widened. In the late eighteenth century, the political outlook of this Russian vanguard had been strongly influenced by the American Bill of Rights. The French Revolution endowed these ideas with irresistible glamor. To this day, the slogans of the French Revolution have remained the guiding principles of world democracy. Even the Atlantic Charter is but a forcible restatement of the same principles.

Equality before the law, freedom of speech and of conscience, free elections of representatives of the people entrusted with making laws and watching over their enforcement—this primer of democracy was early and thoroughly absorbed by Russian liberals. A century before the emergence of a liberal party, the élite of the nation had adopted and assimilated the political and moral ideas upon which were based the liberal parties of France, Britain, and other free countries,—although the realities of Russian society, and in particular the system of serfdom, were in flagrant contradiction to the principles of human and civil rights.

Of this contradiction educated Russians—including Tsar Alexander I himself—were painfully aware. This crowned liberal used to say upon his accession to the throne that it was his dearest dream to transform his empire into a republic. His liberal opinions were

shared by his closest collaborators as well as by the younger officers of the Guards. In the course of the campaigns against Napoleon which took the Russian armies across Europe, these officers had had occasion to observe the way of life of other nations. In Paris they had listened spellbound to the political lectures of Benjamin Constant which were a revelation to them. They returned to Russia their heads filled with liberal ideas. In order to apply them to their own country for the benefit of the people, they formed a secret society—the “Welfare League.” They hoped that Tsar Alexander I—at that time still the “adored monarch” of the whole nation, including these advanced young men—would join their society. It goes without saying that the Tsar wouldn’t think of it. And yet, towards the end of his reign, when shown a list of the members and urged to take stern measures against the conspirators, he replied: “I shared their delusions. It is not for me to punish them.”

It stands to reason that he regarded as “delusions” not so much the ideals of the “Welfare League,” as their applicability to the Russia of that time.

After his death, on the 14th of December 1825, the conspirators attempted to start a mutiny in St. Petersburg and to proclaim a constitution. The uprising was easily crushed by Nicholas I. But the growth of the ideas which had inspired the “Decembrists,” as they came to be called, could not be stopped. The uprising marks the beginning of the ever wider diffusion of the democratic ideas of freedom and right in autocratic Russia. Tsar Nicholas considered them pernicious. He did not share the views of his late brother and spared no efforts to check the growth of a liberal public opinion. During his reign began the tragic estrangement between the government and the “intelligentsia” which culminated in the Revolution of 1917. For this estrangement both sides bear the responsibility. It was their intransigence, their stubborn refusal to understand each other and to compromise that finally brought the Communists to power.

The transition from absolute monarchy to absolute Communism was accomplished—in terms of the historical process—with breathtaking speed. It took less than a century, from 1825 to 1917. Not only Western but even Russian writers often fail to realize how rudely and vehemently history thrust Russia from one system into the other. Only two generations separate the emancipation of the serfs from the establishment of the “kolkhoses”—the Communist state farms. Alexander II liberated the peasants in 1861, Stalin

put them back into the far more oppressive slavery of the kolk-hoses in 1928. Four generations went by between the Decembrists and the Communists—too short a term for a nation to incorporate a new conception of human rights into its way of life and to bring forth a new type of men, capable to put a democratic system into effect. Nevertheless, throughout the nineteenth century, Russia was accumulating new mental and spiritual resources without which no country, big or small, can endure. Public morality was strengthened, vigorous personalities emerged who represented what is best in democracy.

A striking example of this flowering of spiritual forces were the many brilliant and remarkable men of the "Era of the Great Reforms"—the reforms undertaken by Tsar Alexander II in the sixties. The Tsar liberated eighteen million of serfs, introduced rural and municipal self-government, abolished the old corrupt courts of law, and carried through a judicial reform that made Russian administration of justice one of the finest in Europe. This great achievement owes so much to the Tsar's own initiative and goodwill that he deserves a niche of honor in the history of Russian liberalism. It was Russia's misfortune that very few of the Russian intellectuals realized this and were willing to give the Tsar his due either during his lifetime or after his death.

Alexander II was able to carry out his sweeping and far-reaching reforms only because under the reign of his father, Nicholas I, a generation had grown up of enlightened men,—men of high purpose and integrity, endowed with a strong sense of responsibility, whose sole ambition was to devote all their energy to the service of the nation. It may appear strange that their characters and ideas were formed during the thirty years of Tsar Nicholas' reign when it seemed that the dead weight of autocracy had crushed every spark of free thought.

Yet, apparently, there was inherent in the Russian people some robust and healthy spiritual element which even the reactionary police state of Nicholas I proved unable to eradicate. The Russian language helped to keep it alive—Russia's great writers and poets, headed by Pushkin, were her true spiritual liberators. When the Decembrists were asked at the inquest from whom their movement had derived its chief inspiration, they named Pushkin, the poet, although he had never been a member of their secret society. Beginning with him, Russia's greatest creative writers have expressed and maintained those spiritual and moral values that are

the foundation of true liberalism. They fostered and nurtured those freedom-loving men who became the collaborators of Alexander II and who were able, without a revolution, relying solely upon their fund of knowledge and moral strength to carry through a series of radical reforms and to convert their dreams into reality. How fortunate they were!

They brought such fervor and devotion to their strenuous work that the very term "a man of the sixties" has remained in the language a symbol of public-mindedness. To the generations that followed they were a living example of intellectual audacity, loyalty to their principles, selfless social service. The sixties were a revelation of the qualities of statesmanship and citizenship dormant in the Russian people. The Great Reforms were a kind of object-lesson—showing how, without violence and excesses, radical changes could be effected in the life of a huge empire. This had been achieved not by a group, nor a class, nor a party, but by the common non-partisan effort of all the liberal forces stored up during the first half of the nineteenth century. Never again did Russian intelligentsia display such solidarity, such an understanding of the limits of the possible. In 1917, unfortunately, it failed to show the political common sense of the sixties.

The exaltation of the Era of the Great Reforms was shortlived. It lasted just as long as was necessary to conceive, to formulate, and to proclaim the reforms. Then came the more pedestrian, less inspiring though by no means less vital task of putting the plans into practice. All of a sudden something gave way. Historians of the period often use the word "reaction," applying it to the policy of the government. It was not only the government, however, that pulled up and moved backward—society itself suffered a kind of reaction, a deterioration of public morale. The wide circle of sympathetic public opinion which had been the "culture-medium" of the reforms for some reason lost the spirit of sober efficiency which had carried along the great undertaking. Extremism came in its stead. New demands, incapable of immediate realization, were advanced. The whole-hearted cooperation with the government came to an end. The mutual trust between the government and the public was destroyed. The grim spectre of terrorism arose. There began a series of attempts on the life of the Tsar.

The government retaliated with arrests, political trials, press censorship. Compared with the policies of the Soviet régime in our time, these reprisals were child's play. In the nineteenth century

nobody dreamed that in our "enlightened era" despotism could assume such monstrous forms as the Cheka and concentration camps. The socialists of the sixties and seventies were filled with sincere indignation against the verdicts in the political trials—they branded them as "terrorism" on the government's part and derived from them the moral right to retaliate with new terroristic acts, directed mainly against the person of the Tsar.

Once again the antagonism between government and intelligentsia had become acute. But now the social energy had an outlet. This outlet, while not measuring up to the political expectations, filled yet a vital need. Rural and municipal self-government became the practical school where Russian liberals studied the wants of the population and, within limits, learned to satisfy them. Education and medical care, insurance, road-building—all this was slowly built up or reorganized by the Zemstvos (organs of rural self-government), gradually improving conditions in the remotest areas. In some fields the Russian Zemstvos outstripped Western countries. Thus, free medical care for the entire rural population was introduced in Russia as early as the late sixties.

More than anything else, the efficiency of local self-rule made thoughtful Zemstvo workers realize the defects of the government machinery and the shortcomings of autocracy. At first the criticism voiced in these circles was business-like and their political demands rather moderate. After all, as a result of the electoral law that based the vote on property qualifications, the majority of the Zemstvo leaders belonged to the landed gentry. By then, however, liberalism had spread beyond the narrow limits of the ruling upper class. With the diffusion of education, the university faculties and the urban intelligentsia outside the privileged class had embraced it. To the very last, the leading part in the liberal movement belonged to Zemstvo men and university professors. It was not always easy to draw a line of demarcation between these two groups. Such prominent liberals, for instance, as the princes Troubetskoy, Eugene and Sergei, were at the same time brilliant professors of philosophy and Zemstvo councillors in the rural areas where their family estates were located. Nevertheless, a kind of watershed always remained between academic thinkers and Zemstvo workers. The latter had a more practical and sober approach to most problems as well as a better knowledge of the needs and the mentality of the peasants who represented eighty percent of Russia's population.

The professors, on the other hand, were thoroughly familiar with



the latest legal theories expounded in the most advanced textbooks—French, English, German. They knew how to marshal all the arguments, arranged in clauses and paragraphs, in favor of the application to Russia of the liberal measures advocated by Western parliaments. The professors stood for a constitutional doctrine, dogmatic and uncompromising, and the Zemstvo men respectfully—all too respectfully!—made way for them.

Throughout the nineteenth century Russian liberals confined themselves to political discussions within small circles, since to discuss politics publicly was strictly forbidden. Nor was it possible to write about political problems. Only with the accession of Nicholas II, in 1894, things began to move. Liberal claims came into the open and grew more insistent. And what potentially was more dangerous both for the monarchy and for Russia herself, was the ominous spread of Marxism imported from the West in the nineties. The authorities made no fine distinctions and lumped all oppositionist trends together, treating them all alike with suspicion and hostility. But the life of the immense empire made progress inevitable. Literacy was spreading, creating new social needs which sought an outlet. For a time such an outlet was provided by journalism and literature, despite censorship and restrictions. At the turn of the century, a powerful "liberating movement" was in existence, with the purpose to secure the basic human and civil rights and to establish a democratic system.

Until 1905 there were no political parties in Russia. The very idea of forming a political party was considered subversive. Nevertheless, there existed underground socialist organizations, usually directed by their exiled leaders from abroad, most often from Geneva. Their pamphlets and periodicals were published abroad and smuggled into Russia. The exiles maintained contact with Russia without great difficulty, since the Tsarist police was far less watchful and efficient than its Communist counterpart in our days. The Communists now in power have not forgotten their past conspiratorial training, and know how to cope with underground activities. Under their rule neither a human being nor the printed word can be safely smuggled across the Russian border. Under the monarchy this was being done all the time, which greatly facilitated the task of the revolutionaries.

Socialist theories in their humanitarian aspect sometimes coincided with the ideals of the liberals who to some extent sacrificed the consistency of political thought for the sake of certain urgent social



needs. As time went on, however, these two trends of Russian opposition—socialist and liberal—went separate ways and grew farther and farther apart. The socialists—who regarded their doctrines as the last word in science—displayed an arrogant sense of superiority. However, in the first years of this century, when the constitutional movement was gathering momentum, there was a short period of collaboration between liberals and socialists in the common struggle for a constitution. In this struggle the liberals went so far as to adopt certain conspiratorial methods of the underground that were essentially alien to them. In 1902 they started the publication in Stuttgart of an oppositionist review, *Osvobozhdenie* (Liberation), which reached Russia by underground ways and gained wide circulation. Inside Russia they formed a secret society, the Liberation League, whose ideas found expression in the Stuttgart review. Next to the liberals, a few moderate socialists belonged to the League.

The members of this secret organization would send reports to the editor of the review, P. B. Struve, denouncing the sins and shortcomings of the Tsarist régime. Side by side with such articles the review published others of a positive kind—expounding the basic ideas of liberalism and the program of the opposition. The general, still inarticulate but steadily growing yearning for freedom was molded here into an orderly well-knit system. To many Russians this was a revelation, since inside Russia the very word “constitution” was still a criminal offense. It could not be uttered aloud.

When in the course of an attempt to get a few issues of *Osvobozhdenie* into Russia I was arrested and brought to trial, I tried to explain in court that my goal was not “revolution” but “constitution.” The presiding judge cut me short and forbade me to go on. This was in March, 1904. Less than two years later, on October 17, 1905, the Tsar, yielding to the national clamor and scared by the general strike which had paralyzed the life of the country, issued a manifesto granting some measure of popular representation and the fundamental freedoms.

Those were days of stirring emotion and enthusiasm. The liberals summoned a convention in Moscow and formed the first liberal party in Russia. Some proposed to name it the Party of Popular Freedom, others—the Constitutional Democratic Party. The latter clumsy designation was adopted, but soon was abbreviated to the initials C.-D. (pronounced in Russian Ca-Day)—and as “Cadets” the liberals were known throughout the existence of their party. The socialists by then had seceded from the common front, since

the Cadets stood for constitutional monarchy while the socialists advocated a republic.

The platform of the liberals had been so thoroughly worked out in their review *Osvobozhdenie* that its adoption now was virtually unanimous. Considered in the light of Russia's general backwardness, this platform was by no means moderate. It demanded popular representation based upon universal, direct, equal and secret suffrage; equality of all classes and nationalities before the law (this latter point was of great importance to the Jewish minority which was subjected to special restrictive legislation); guarantees of individual freedom; freedom of speech, of assembly, of religion. With regard to social problems, the program displayed the same radical reformism that characterized the progressives in all advanced Western countries. After all, this took place nearly fifty years ago when social legislation was still in the embryonic stage everywhere.

The agrarian problem received a more radical treatment than that of the urban worker. The top leaders of the Cadet party were landowners, some of them owners of very large estates. And yet this landed gentry had arrived at the conviction that the land problem could be solved only by means of the compulsory alienation of the landowners' property for distribution among land-poor peasants. It is true that the liberal program provided for a fair compensation of the landlords for the confiscated land—but in the agrarian councils of the party there were always some who maintained that this compensation should be below the market price of the land.

The agrarian program of the Cadets provoked the enmity of the still influential group of rightist landowners who were not disposed to part with any of their property. No less hostile were the socialists. In fact, during all of its short but colorful life the Cadet party had to fight on two fronts—against the government and against the socialists.

During three years of a furious attack on the government—which reciprocated blows with blows and took no step toward conciliation—the mutual exasperation steadily increased, and with it grew the political demands of the opposition. The Tsar's Manifesto of 1905 failed to disarm even the liberals; much less did it satisfy the left—socialist—wing which would accept nothing less than a socialist republic and a Constituent Assembly. Accordingly, they boycotted the elections to the first Duma and attended electoral meetings with the sole purpose of heckling and exposing the "opportunism" of the liberals who were whole-heartedly participating in the campaign.

The socialist speakers denounced the liberals as traitors and enemies of the people because the Cadet party stood for constitutional monarchy instead of a republic and for social reform instead of social revolution. As a result of the socialist boycott, the liberals had to assume the whole burden of explaining and interpreting to the people the new political rights and duties implied in the Manifesto. The Cadets were equal to the task in every respect. In their ranks were found brilliant speakers, eminent legal minds, distinguished economists. The liberal speakers admirably knew how to analyze and make clear to their audiences the most complicated legal and social problems about which the majority of the voters were totally uninformed. The electoral campaign actually became a kind of training in law. As soon as the first opportunity was offered to discuss politics openly, the Russians proved themselves masters of the spoken word. We all were amazed at the number of brilliant orators in our midst.

Nor had we ever suspected how intense was the desire of the population, both urban and rural, to understand the meaning of the great events that were taking place. Many educated Europeans might have envied the fervent intellectual curiosity of these often illiterate Russian men and women.

Although both socialist parties boycotted the elections, not a few independent socialists stood for election and won a number of seats in the Duma. When the Duma convened at the Tavrishesky Palace, they joined forces and formed a sizeable group which called itself "*Trudoviki*"—Laborites. They brought great earnestness to their task and a lively concern with the needs of the people. Nor were they short of gifted orators. What this group did lack was the experience of public affairs which the Cadets had acquired in many years of activities in local self-government and the universities. They were well aware of this themselves. When the two opposition groups—Laborites and Cadets—came together for the first joint conference at the Cadet Club to work out a common strategy, the chairman of the Laborites, Ivan Zhilkin, declared with engaging candor:

"We are closer to the people than you are. Possibly we are better acquainted with their needs. But you have experience on your side, yours is the power of knowledge and talent, and we are willing to learn from you."

If one considers class origin, they were certainly closer to the "common people." Their followers were mostly peasants and members of the half-educated lower provincial intelligentsia. As to the

Cadets, while they pursued no class interest and went so far as to sacrifice the class interest of a large part of their membership,—they were, nevertheless, by birth, breeding, and education, a party of “gentlemen.” Many of them, whether titled or not, belonged to the oldest and noblest families of the land. In their ranks were professors, scholars, eminent jurists—they certainly represented what today is called an “élite.” Even their unrelenting foe, Prime Minister Stolypin, called them the brains of the nation.

In the first Duma the Cadets, partly as a result of the socialist boycott, found themselves an overwhelming majority. The entire Duma, with the exception of a tiny group of so-called “Progressives,” was in opposition to the government. To the Cadets fell the task of being the pioneers of Russian parliamentarism. It was a twofold task—political and technical. The latter was brilliantly solved. The Cadets set up an efficient secretariat, arranged for stenographic recordings, introduced an orderly procedure. However, “order” was hardly the watchword of the first Duma. It had arisen on the crest of a revolutionary wave which ebbed away only much later, after the dismissal of the second Duma. Throughout the lifetime of the first Duma, the revolution not only raged outside the walls of Tavrishesky Palace but affected the mood of the Duma members themselves. The dignified elegance of the palace—built by Catherine the Great for her lover Potemkin and placed by her descendant Nicholas II at the disposal of the representatives of the people—time and again was invaded by delegations voicing demands and carrying petitions. The quiet lobby became a place for noisy meetings and heated speeches with the ever recurring refrain:

“The country cannot wait. . . . The country demands. . . .”

From the lobby this mood was carried over to the rostrum of the Duma. The Duma consisted almost entirely of oppositionists, at long last given the opportunity to vent openly their stored-up resentment against the régime and their dreams of a reborn Russia—and they made the most of it. Government and Duma faced each other like mortal enemies. They did not understand each other, they did not and would not cooperate. After less than three months the first Duma was dismissed. Three more elections were held and three more Dumas convened. Each had its own character. But in neither of them did the Cadets wield the majority. In the second Duma they were outnumbered by the socialists. After its dismissal, the government revised the electoral law, and the next two Dumas were con-

trolled by the rightists—which had been the government's objective all along.

And yet the Cadets, despite their mistakes, despite the attacks upon them from right and left, throughout the short lifespan allotted to Russian popular representation (1906–17), were closely linked with Russia's first Parliament and not only maintained but strengthened their influence in the nation. Their authority increased in the same measure as the Duma grew to be an integral part of the public life. Despite the frequent and often violent clashes between Duma members and the Tsar's ministers in the open sessions—in the committees both sides gradually learned to work together and to discuss quietly the legislative proposals. Here the academic scholarship and the Zemstvo experience of the Cadets—and even more so their unquestioned political integrity—lent weight and authority to their opinions. Even their opponents in Duma and government could not afford to disregard them.

The existence of the Duma had a constructive effect upon the life of the nation. Russia rapidly developed both materially and spiritually. In 1916, during the first World War, E. Kovalevsky, a member of the Octobrist party, brought in a bill providing for the introduction of universal education by 1922. The bill was adopted and would have been carried into effect if the revolution had not intervened.

The war against Germany brought government and opposition temporarily together. Through the efforts of P. N. Miliukov, leader of the Cadets, the "Progressive Bloc" was formed in the Duma with the purpose to help the Government's war effort. It included all parties with the exception of the extreme right which refused to work under Miliukov's chairmanship, and the socialists who were defeatists. It might have been hoped that the inner peace would help Russia win the war. However, towards the end of 1915, military disasters as well as German propaganda—backed up by the Bolsheviks—undermined that peace and destroyed all confidence in the government. In this crisis the opposition failed to stand the test and proved powerless to avert the revolution, which broke out in the midst of the war. By then, the Russian Army was better equipped and had a greater fighting capacity than in the beginning. Nevertheless, under the impact of revolutionary propaganda it turned into a disorderly horde. The Tsar abdicated. The Provisional government tried to carry on the war "in union with the Allies until the victorious end." However, from the very first day of the revolution,



the socialists had formed the "Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies"—which paralyzed every action of the Provisional government in which the Cadets at first held the majority. Unfortunately, the government lacked strong men, capable of checking the mounting anarchy and of providing a powerful leadership.

The Germans conveyed Lenin to Petrograd. He at once started his propaganda campaign, calling for a separate peace with the external foe and a civil war within Russia. At that time Miliukov was still influential in the Provisional government. At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Cadet party he was urged to have Lenin arrested as a dangerous defeatist. He replied:

"I cannot apply the methods of autocratic power to my political opponents!"

This was the answer not of a statesman but of a scholarly doctrinaire. While Miliukov in his speeches and articles continued, with his usual courage and honesty, to call for "war to the victorious end," Lenin was allowed with impunity to exhort the soldiers to quit the trenches and go home to their villages to help take away the land from the landlords. The soldiers, weary of war, gladly obeyed him.

Instead of victory over the Germans there came the ignominious peace of Brest-Litovsk. Instead of freedom came the Cheka.

Every vestige of liberalism, not only parliamentary but also literary, individual, intimate, disappeared from the Russian scene. All parties—including the Socialists and, of course, the Cadets—were swept away. The Cadets tried to organize the population for a fight against Bolshevism. Many of them joined the White Armies. In Moscow they carried on an underground struggle against the Soviet rule and many, both men and women, paid for this with their lives in the cellars of the Cheka. Others went into exile and stubbornly tried to explain to the public opinion of the free world what a threat to Christian civilization the Soviet régime represented. Hardly anyone listened to them.

The Cadet party is no more. But Russian liberalism is not dead. Over there, in Russia, at the price of heartbreaking experience, people have learned to realize what becomes of life when it is stripped of justice, of right, of human respect and freedom.



# The Soviet Citizen—a Profile

BY OLEG ANISIMOV

THERE is no greater danger for a modern statesman than oversimplification. Yet while we readily agree that human emotions are extremely complex and often contradictory as long as we deal with individual psychology, we invariably try to reduce political emotions to a very few simple elements, though in actual fact politics involve very subtle personal emotions.

This is particularly true of Soviet Russia for the simple reason that political oppression breeds emotional instability.

Most of the so-called mysteriousness of the East, the enigma of the Russian (or, for that matter, the Indian or Japanese), is in actual fact no mystery at all, if we analyze it in the light of psychoanalysis.

"The Russians are so supercilious, their representatives are so rude; one simply can't talk to them."

"The Russians are nice and decent people, I have known so many of them personally." I hear these contradictory opinions very often, and had I not been Russian myself, I would certainly feel very puzzled at this apparent incapacity of the foreigners to understand my fellow-countrymen. But being a Russian, I can agree with both views whose compatibility only becomes obvious in the light of an analysis of political repression.

During the last war I accompanied throughout Germany a group of Soviet anti-Communists, who had joined the Germans in the honest belief that Hitler was fighting Communism, not Russia. There were hundreds of thousands of Russians—particularly in the first year of the war—who went over to the Germans to fight a *political* war against Stalin. Our group was made up of young people. They were all convinced anti-Communists, and advocated the institution of a political system based on individual initiative, private property, and first and foremost, on freedom from political persecution. Pandering to their instincts of property, the Nazi authorities showed them prosperous farms, excellent pasture lands, large cattle herds, comfortable farm houses.

One would suppose these boys, all of them sons of farmers ruined by Stalin's collectivization, would be delighted to see the prosperity achieved by the German peasant under the system of private ownership.

Not at all. Their attitude towards the German farmer was one of biting irony and smug contempt. Comments ranged from:

"His (the farmer's) only interest in life is cows, sheep, and pigs," to:

"They think that happiness depends upon the number of cows (sheep, pigs, geese, hens, acres, houses, etc.) you own."

This attitude is a rule. Mark, I am talking of people who had sincerely broken away from Communism.

Where does this attitude come from? And why did these boys—and they were good, honest boys, who hated Communism and collective farming—scoff at their German neighbour, who had achieved what they were themselves advocating?

Before giving an answer, I should like to draw an analogy between the attitude of the Soviet citizen towards Germany and that of his American counterpart.

After the surrender of Germany I acted for some time as an interpreter with an American military unit, and though I found many points of similarity between the American GI and his Russian counterpart, there was one distinctive feature in the American character which was absent in my Soviet fellow-countrymen: I mean the American capacity to notice and admire without envy all the good things they find outside their own country.

My fellow-countrymen remained critical of everything they saw in Germany, even though they had joined the Germans to fight against Communism. The American GI, on the contrary, found words of impartial praise for everything he thought good, though he was in enemy territory.

Why so?

Let us beware from putting this down to some inherent badness of the Russian nature.

This would be the first step along the fateful road of racial discrimination, a silent approval of Rosenberg's doctrine. The explanation lies elsewhere.

Private initiative was always under a considerable handicap in Russia. Now it is positively under taboo. To nurture personal aspirations and individual wishes means to be different from the others, to deviate from the official party line. It is a sign of secret personal ambitions, and therefore of political unreliability, a proof that one is not content with what the Soviet system has to offer, an insult to Stalin.

To avoid being wiped out by the political police, the Soviet citizen

has to repress all his personal aspirations of a more or less individualistic character. Renunciation is his life's refrain, renunciation resulting from utter impotence. Quite insensibly a sense of inferiority begins to grow up in him, and to protect him from despair nature begins to react. To ward off a gnawing sense of impotence the subconscious mind usually takes up a negative attitude towards the unattainable.

"I can't do this or that, I am not allowed to have the things I like—well, I can as well do without them! In fact I don't need them! They are not worth having!" A negative attitude is more often than not our mind's self-defence against a depressing inferiority complex resulting from impotence.

Automatically our subconscious mind evolves an anti-toxin to neutralize the inferiority complex. There appears a superiority complex which is but a distorted reflection of the sense of inferiority. We become bent upon discovering real or imaginary proofs of our superiority to compensate—often with a vengeance—for the sickening feeling of impotence. It is essential to realize this in order to understand the apparently complex and contradictory workings of what is usually termed the mystery of the Russian—and more generally the Eastern—soul.

The distinctive feature of a negative complex that results from an inferiority feeling is its instability.

Herein lies the explanation of the attitude ninety per cent of Soviet citizens take up towards the West. It is a mixture of arrogance and humility. They always move between extremes.

I have often deliberately made the following psychological experiment which invariably succeeded:

I talked (outside of Russia, of course) to Soviet citizens slightly about the Soviet Union. Immediately they protested the Russian superiority: I had better not talk about things of which I knew next to nothing. The West was rotten. There was no culture in the West, nothing but corruption and exploitation.

How different the reaction, however, if I spoke of the great progress achieved by Russia under Stalin!

"Progress," they would sneer, "exploitation of the workers and a lot of ballyhoo, that's all the progress!"

Nothing is more erroneous than the widespread notion that the Soviet citizen hates the West. His attitude is a mixture of admiration, distrust, and touchiness. In the depths of his heart he longs

to possess the gadgets of Western civilization, enjoy the political freedoms, share in the cultural and material blessings.

Yet let us also beware of attaching an unqualified importance to his admiration of things Western and generalize the conclusions that can be drawn from Russia's defeatist mood around 1940-41. This self-conscious admiration can very easily turn into blind hatred. The immediate accompaniment of an inferiority complex is extreme susceptibility. To cover up his sense of inferiority the Soviet citizen will assume at the slightest provocation on a foreigner's part a mask of arrogance, a supreme contempt for what he will describe as the "outward" and "superficial" civilization of the West. If you rouse him, he will go to any lengths to rid himself of his irritated sense of inferiority, and if there is no other course left open to him, he will try to destroy what he knows to be superior. The easiest way to equality is by leveling down.

It is essential to realize the political importance of this feature which I shall illustrate by another example. During the German occupation of Russia, a German official of the Agricultural Department in the area where I happened to live had instruction to give horses to those Russian peasants who needed them for farm work. The peasants would accept the horses in a most matter of fact way, without any feeling of gratitude towards the authorities who, they reasoned, would take in crops what they gave in horses.

In a neighbouring area another German official had no horses to distribute. Yet he would receive in his office any peasant who came to see him, would talk to him through an interpreter interspersing his speech for politeness' sake with a few Russian words he knew, and would explain to him why he had no horses. Well, he was the most popular man in the neighbourhood. In spite of very hard times, these people placed a higher value on good treatment than on material prosperity. The peasants cherished the memory of their interview with the "good German chief." They would have laid down their lives for him. "If only they were all like him!"

I should like to draw special attention to this aspect of national psychology, which is too often underestimated or misunderstood by our statesmen. In modern society the militant inferiority complex has two outlets: nationalism and social revolt. Communists gamble upon both the world over.

In his article "Workers Don't Strike for Fun" (*Reader's Digest*, June, 1947). Mr. McIntyre, analyzing the causes of strikes in the United States says:

"Little things can cause a lot of trouble, for instance, luxurious executives' washrooms when workers have only cold water, leaky sinks and poor quality towels, or an executive who walks through 'No Smoking' areas puffing a cigar."

The worker is so susceptible to any infringement of his rights because he is aware that economically he is weaker than the management.

Magnify this cigar a millionfold and you will begin to understand how people feel towards a conqueror. And what adds a sharp edge to this feeling is the fact that while a worker can leave his factory, if he dislikes the management, there is no escape from a conquered country. Incredible though this may seem, lack of tact in the handling of foreign affairs may have fateful consequences. It was not spontaneous Communist enthusiasm, but Hitler's blunders that made the Red Army soldiers, who surrendered by hundreds of thousands in 1941, fight so fiercely in 1943-45.

I come now to the third and the most important aspect of emotional repression due to political oppression.

Communism has not changed human nature. Yet to a considerable extent it has succeeded in canalizing natural egotism into channels of collective, state-conditioned thinking.

In a country, where the possession of a motor car or a decent flat is possible only as a "function," as a reward for discharging public duties, the citizen insensibly comes to identify his personal ambitions and aspirations with state service. Through political oppression the Soviet citizen has come to think that a *direct* satisfaction of his personal ambitions is impossible. A satisfaction seems possible only through serving the community, *his* community.

Herein lies the dangerous political self-delusion. The East has always believed in its superiority. Yet this belief had up to very recent times a religious, or—more generally—a spiritual, never a political tinge. During my study years in France, I made friends with many Chinese, Hindus, Annamese, who trusted me, because being a Russian, I was somehow closer to their Eastern community. They all spoke of the "rotten" and "mechanized" Western civilization. And from their point of view they may have been right. I do not postulate here the superiority of the West over the East.

Yet, politically, nothing is more dangerous than the present position: the East is eagerly taking in everything Western civilization has to offer it, except its individualism. The peoples of Russia get "loaded" with all the atomic energy of an individualistic civiliza-



tion which fosters personal aspirations and a thirst for the wonderful comforts afforded by modern technology, but they are refused any satisfaction of their deep-seated longings, unless through serving their community.

I know of no more greedy soldier than the Red Army soldier. He is at any time ready to stake his life for a golden watch. He is not bent upon accumulating wealth; all he wants is to satisfy the personal aspirations forever inhibited and repressed by the Communist system.

Herein lies great danger. The idea of state service becomes charged with all the energy of personal ambitions and individual aspirations that have for decades gone unsatisfied. I should describe it as a sort of "subjective totalitarianism."

Russia is a reservoir of seething energies and repressed aspirations. Her rulers have deliberately plugged up all the outlets along lines of private initiative. Much depends upon whether or not the democratic statesmen will succeed in convincing the bulk of the Russian population that the most complete fulfilment of the human personality lies on the road to democratic freedom. This is a delicate political task, but it is too important to be neglected.

But, you will ask, what can the democratic statesmen do to canalize the Russian dynamism into democratic channels?

Much more than most people care to admit, and certainly not along the lines of power politics pursued today by most European statesmen.

In 1940 the Soviet occupation authorities in the Baltic States offered me the post of a teacher in one of their schools. Naturally, I had to teach after Soviet textbooks. The Soviet interpretation of history caused me to revise all ideas about the problem of loyalty. "Nation" and "Government" are treated as two completely distinct notions. The only admissible form of collective loyalty is, according to the Soviet view, loyalty to the "correct" political theory (Communism), not loyalty to one's government, whose interests may be in direct opposition to the people's real interests.

Every Soviet child is brought up in the belief that he must love his native country because it is allegedly the only really free and democratic country in the world, not because it is the spot upon which he happened to be born. It is to this country that the "suffering workers" the world over look for their liberation from the chains of capitalism.

I hardly need to point out here that from a narrowly nationalistic



point of view such a politically coloured loyalty reposes on a very shaky foundation. For if the citizens come to the conclusion that their government is "wrong," that it pursues a bad policy, they feel justified in allying themselves with a foreign power in order to fight their "government" and thus serve their "nation."

Yet, in a deeper sense, this is a sound view. A really honest political program such as, for instance, supernational democracy or a world federation of nations *includes* a fair settlement of all national problems in a spirit of tolerance and equity. Politics today are more important than national problems. To a large extent the success of the Communists outside Russia must be attributed to their having understood this simple fact. In an atomic age all forms of nationalism become absurd.

Herein lies the fundamental distinction between the connotations of the term "loyalty" as understood by the democratic West and the totalitarian East.

An American or an Englishman can not look upon his government as a separate entity divorced from the nation's will any more than he can imagine a dream to assume substance and independent life without the dreamer. In their countries the relationship between state affairs and national will are regularly readjusted through popular elections. At regular intervals the canal locks linking the sphere of politics with that of human affairs are opened and both find their level reaching a provisional balance. Not so in Soviet Russia. Her gigantic political superstructure has largely remained distinct from the national will. It is upon the secret undercurrent of human emotions that we must build our ultimate hope of preserving peace.

Anybody who remembers the Russian youths of thirty years ago cannot fail to notice the striking change in the outward appearance of the young people in Russia. The Soviet Russian youths have lost the suave and evasive delicacy which distinguished the pre-revolutionary generations. By contrast, they seem more dynamic, much more solidly built, stronger but less refined, more angular and lacking in the subtle Slavic grace. The mental and physical differentiation, which made of the old Russian society a collection of individually distinct personalities, has given way to a certain mental and physical standardization. With few exceptions the Soviet youth bears that stamp of uniformity that usually marks out professional soldiers. The continued suppression of all individual aspirations, the necessity to concentrate exclusively upon communal problems,

the strict control imposed on all acts and most thoughts has resulted in the appearance of a standardized type. After the surrender of Germany, I happened to witness the spectacle of a Red Army officer picking his men (Soviet citizens) out of an auxiliary Army Unit (under German command), made up of the children of White Russian émigrés, whose parents had left Russia before the Revolution, and Soviet citizens, who had joined the Germans to fight Stalin. As only Soviet citizens were liable to compulsory repatriation, the Red Army officer was allowed to arrest none but his men. Nationality was not shown on the soldiers' pay-books, and most had destroyed all their identity papers. Yet in some twenty minutes, out of a total of five hundred men of whom approximately half were Soviet citizens, the officer picked unmistakably all his men, judging only by appearance. It was an easy task. With the exception of eight men all the rest owned up, though nobody could have forced them to do so, and stubborn denial instead of ready confession meant all the difference between life and death.

A terrible illustration, by the way, of the prevalence of the gregarious instinct in Soviet Russia.

In his book *The Coming Defeat of Communism*, Mr. Burnham tells of a letter he received from a Czech from behind the Iron Curtain. "You must convince us that the victory of democracy is inevitable, then we shall have the strength to hold out, otherwise I don't know." (I quote from memory.)

It is difficult to find a better illustration of the *political determinism* which is very characteristic also of the Soviet Union. One of the most efficient weapons of the Soviet system of education consists in the taking for granted of controversial issues. All Soviet books speak of the "scientific discoveries" of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin (meaning in the main the economic theories of Marx as "corrected" by Stalin and presented as "laws").

The average citizen may come to the conclusion that Marx and Lenin have "erred," but he almost never comes to the conclusion that there is probably no rigorous determinism in the development of mankind. He usually has some faith and only this enables him to see this world as an orderly place. In 1943 I made the acquaintance of a Soviet guerilla girl, who was captured by the Germans, pardoned and "converted to the Western way (or to what she considered to be the Western way). Her "conversion" was genuine and sincere and she bore all the outward signs of "Westernization": a nice hat instead of the shapeless bonnet, an innocently coquettish

way of dressing, etc. We made friends and often talked politics. She spoke of the Western ways with approval, but without enthusiasm, like a child who knows that Santa Claus does not exist, but isn't happy with his new wisdom.

"You see," she told me, "in this Western world there is more freedom, people think of their own affairs, plan their lives for themselves, speak openly, follow their natural bent. But it was so wonderful to think that everything was grand and good in our country, that we were on the right side, that it was our duty to save the rest of the world from the terrible capitalist and fascist exploitation. Now I know all this was not true. Still, I think that we ought to have some great common goal to strive for. Everybody for himself does not satisfy me."

Usually the Soviet citizen remains "faith-conditioned," regardless of what the *content* of his faith is. Whether Communist or not, he continues to see the world in white and black, in terms of absolute truth and error.

For the Western world the connotations of the word "good" (as applied to politics) are to a large extent moral. For the Soviet citizen, particularly for the younger generation, these terms have a "scientific" meaning, in conformity with the general historical and economic "laws," of Marx. Hence also the Soviet citizens' lack of initiative, an inclination to believe in organization, in a lead from above.

He possesses considerable ingenuity and initiative as long as he moves on the plane of small practical matters. In these he is as much inclined to discount any discipline, as he is prepared to follow a lead given from above in "higher" politics, if this lead is firm and falls within the category of events which he considers to be "inevitable." His idea of the rôle played by the individual in the life of a community is not that of everyone contributing his part to the common effort and helping in a great enterprise, but rather that of performing a function, filling a place, which can be filled in exactly the same way by any other individual. And, paradoxically, hence also extreme individualism bordering on anarchy as soon as the controls are relaxed.

The very fact that for over thirty years the Soviet leaders, through radio, newspapers, and other official channels of public information have never for a moment stopped reviling the West, is ample proof of the extraordinary hold of the West over the minds and hearts of the Russian people. The halo surrounding the West is brighter be-

cause, owing to the Iron Curtain, the West is largely a fairyland. Elegant dresses, smart cars, high technological standards, well-supplied shops strike this imagination dulled by drabness. The Communist Party has vindicated this admiration by incautiously proclaiming the famous slogan: "to overtake and surpass America."

Several Soviet youths told me that their life's greatest experience—greater even than their first love—was the memory of an American film they had seen. It was not the plot that had carried them away, but the way people lived, talked to each other, dressed, ate, took a bath.

When, in 1940, the Red Army occupied the Baltic States, no doubt was left in the Soviet citizen's mind but that the West meant prosperity and much greater freedom than he had enjoyed in his native land.

Yet, one should beware of attaching too much importance to this admiration of the West. It is motivated by a revulsion from the order established by Communism, rather than by a conscious approval of the Western ways. The West is, so to speak, a focal point of a Soviet citizen's vague longings and inarticulate aspirations. But the ignorance of the West is terrifying.

It is certainly an overstatement to say that *all* Russians are against their present rulers and Communism. Yet there is no doubt that a political disgruntlement is today as widespread as before the war in Russia.

There is a general rule roughly applying to the whole Soviet-bred generation: a young Soviet citizen's Communist leanings vary inversely with his age. There is much truth in the Soviet anecdote about the litter of red puppies which Stalin wanted to see. When he found that they were ordinary brown little dogs, he asked the Zoo director for an explanation. He was told that this is the usual course of events, the puppies remain red only as long as they are blind, but as soon as their eyes open, they lose their red tinge. The closer the contact with Soviet reality, the greater the revulsion against Communism. If there is any political idealism in the young citizen's heart, he drops it when he leaves school a couple of years later. His disillusionment takes either the form of a secret opposition to the existing régime or a cynical indifference.

Yet in spite of the easy-going cynicism which so many Soviet citizens adopt in later life, political disgruntlement is general and widespread. One would hardly find anybody in the Soviet Union without a secret yet deep and nagging grievance against the govern-

ment. Sometimes it is caused by the arrest of a popular teacher in one of the innumerable purges, sometimes it is nourished by 'unforgettable memories of the terrible years of collectivization, sometimes by the unexpected shock experienced at the sight of the prosperous West, as it was during the occupation of the Baltic States and Poland.

Such, in brief, is what I consider to be the essential psychic mechanism by which the Soviet citizen is actuated. The implications of this are not without significance for Western democracy.



# The American Rôle in the Siberian Intervention

BY JOHN ALBERT WHITE

IN the thirty years that have passed since the American Expeditionary Force withdrew from Siberia, the intervention in which it participated has remained highly significant in Soviet thinking about the surrounding world. Historians, journalists, and political leaders have found ways of turning the intervention to their respective professional and personal advantage. The collecting of documents, the publication of memoirs, and the writing of interpretative accounts have kept the subject fresh in the national consciousness, furnishing periodically new stimuli to the carefully preserved suspicions of the capitalist West. Since the close of the second World War, however, the unfolding developments of the ideological war between Russia and the West have given the American share in the Siberian intervention a new and vastly greater significance.

The change has resulted in part from the emphasis currently assigned by Soviet propaganda to the United States as the leader of the capitalist, reactionary, and therefore anti-Soviet world. As a part of this general attack, two writers whose articles have appeared recently in the Soviet journal, *Voprosy Istorii*, have sought to reconstruct the period of the intervention to fit the currently popular view of the United States.<sup>1</sup> Using old and well-worn documents and viewpoints, the authors reach the easily anticipated conclusion that, far from being a recent development, the United States has been a leader of the predatory capitalist powers and a threat to the territorial integrity of Russia at least since the October Revolution. They are, in fact, of the opinion that the intervention represents the supreme effort of the United States to convert Russia into a colonial appanage. If the historical parallel were not already clear to the reader, one of these authors, Gulyga, makes it so by comparing the methods of strangulation used then and now by the

<sup>1</sup>A. Hirshfeld, "O roli S. Sh. A. v organizatsii antisovetskoi interventsii v Sibiri i na Dalnem Vostoke," *Voprosy Istorii* (Moscow), August, 1948, pp. 3-22; A. Gulyga, "Nachalnyy period antisovetskoi interventsii S. Sh. A. (1917-1918 gg.)," *Voprosy Istorii* (Moscow), March, 1950, pp. 3-25.



United States with respect to those about to be subjugated to its financial power. American loans and credits, he writes, were extended to the Russian Provisional Government only for purchases made in the United States, a policy which finds its most recent application in the Marshall Plan.

Meanwhile, the war in Korea has added a significance of a somewhat different kind to the intervention. For the present conflict is, after the Siberian intervention and the Pacific phase of the second World War, the third time the United States has supported with large scale military forces its position in the Far East. Until our recent struggle against Japan, therefore, the part played by the United States in the Siberian intervention remained the most vigorous step theretofore taken in behalf of our Far Eastern interests.

The American involvement in the intervention was the result of two characteristics of our relations with the Far East in the second decade of this century. The first of these was the extent to which American business had by then learned to look to Eastern Asia as a promising field for future expansion and thus to value highly the open door for business opportunity. Centering their attention on North China, Manchuria, and the new and undeveloped regions of Siberia, a number of American business firms had, by 1914, made significant beginnings there.

The future of such economic enterprises was, however, bound to be conditioned by the simultaneous development of Japanese interests in the same regions and by the resulting American-Japanese rivalry. Thus, the second of the basic factors which conditioned our participation in the intervention, the outbreak of the first World War, had the effect of introducing what was essentially a new and more acute phase of the existing American-Japanese rivalry. The reason for this was that, although these two antagonists were theoretically members of the same group of allied nations committed to cooperate in the war against the Central Powers, Japan was determined to use the opportunity presented by the involvement of the Western European Powers in the war in the West to enlarge her sphere on the nearby Asiatic mainland. The revolution in Russia, occurring at this convenient juncture, served only to open in Siberia new areas to Japanese aggression. It was the determination of the United States at this point to prevent further expansion on the part of Japan that brought about the Siberian intervention. The Japanese initiative in this venture, supported also by later

Soviet historians, was proclaimed by the Soviet organ *Izvestiia* which announced on April 7, 1918, that: "Now the Japanese invasion is an accomplished fact."

The American economic interests in Siberia and Manchuria rose to considerable proportions during the quarter of a century preceding the outbreak of the first World War. Encouraged by the building of the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern railways, American firms whose products suited the needs of the undeveloped regions found here a ready market. The Baldwin Locomotive Company supplied rolling stock for the new Chinese Eastern Railway. The International Harvester Company had established a network of sales depots throughout Siberia. Both the Singer Sewing Machine and J. M. Coates companies sold their products in Russia while fresh and tinned fruit from California helped to vary the monotonous Siberian diet. These commercial ventures, it should be emphasized, always constituted a very small proportion of American foreign business and did not by any means enjoy at all times the complete good will of the Russian government. But it was believed that their importance lay in their rôle as a foundation for greater expansion in the future when the growth of the local economy would itself produce an expanding market.

The American-Japanese rivalry in Siberia arose from the circumstance that Japan looked upon the same area as one of the goals of her own future expansion. Poor in natural resources herself, Japan had long hoped to acquire as much of the Russian sphere in Eastern Asia as possible. In defense of her claims she cited the wealth of the United States in resources and the potentialities of other parts of the Americas to serve the future needs of the United States, to prove her own greater claim to the resources of the nearby Asiatic mainland and that, in the division of the riches of the Pacific, these should of right fall to her. This sharp clash of interests was accentuated, moreover, by the Japanese tendency to establish a monopoly wherever possible and thus nullify the American efforts to preserve the open door for business opportunity. It was on this issue that the Siberian intervention was fought.

The occasion for the Siberian intervention was the defection of Russia from the Allied cause, itself a result of the internal breakdown in her economic and political life which developed into a revolution. This in turn not only made Russia unable to prosecute actively her share in the war against the Central Powers but, even worse, made her a prey to the aggressions of all the powers, both

enemy and ally. Thus, with the potential and later actual aggression of the Central Powers against the territory and resources of Russia, the excuse was offered for the other powers to follow suit. In the Far East this was of course the opening which Japan had so long awaited. Having already begun to press her demands against Russia in the Russo-Japanese treaty of 1916, it was to be expected that she would do so with even greater vigor after the October Revolution. At this time Japan openly demanded the approval of the Allied powers for a sole military intervention as the most direct means of achieving the access to the resources of Siberia which she desired.

Japan at this point was spurred on by a number of coexisting factors to press her desires upon her allies with a vigor quite unbecoming an ally of Russia. Among these factors were the stern refusal of the United States to approve such a move as well as the American efforts to stabilize the situation in Russia by sending railway experts and instituting railway regulation and supervision. Japan also viewed with concern not only the imminent prospect of the establishment of a revolutionary government so near her own borders and intended spheres of interest, but also the activities in nearby Siberia of the Czechoslovak army which, Japan suspected, might be used to bring about an Allied intervention without her participation. Finally, the failure of her own protégé, the Cossack Ataman Semenov, to press successfully his campaign against the Soviets, gave Japan additional cause for alarm. In view of these circumstances, the Japanese government took active steps to warn the world of her serious intentions with respect to Siberia. In early April, 1918, a small Japanese force was landed at Vladivostok, ostensibly to protect the lives and property of Japanese subjects endangered by lawless conditions. Actually, the landing coincided with the arrival at Vladivostok of the first Czechoslovak force and therefore registered the Japanese fear that, instead of shipping these troops to the Western Front in Europe as had been proposed, the Allies might attempt to use them to initiate a military intervention without her.

After this, events leading directly to military intervention moved rapidly. In May, the Czechoslovaks, scattered throughout Siberia en route to Vladivostok for transportation to Europe, rose against the Soviets and in the course of the next three months captured the entire Trans-Siberian Railway as well as the principal towns of Siberia. In July, President Wilson gave American approval for the

intervention when it appeared that the alternative was an Allied intervention without American participation. In August and September, the Allied forces landed at Vladivostok.

Since the interests of the United States were centered in the preservation of the open door against any efforts to take advantage of the confusion in Russia to establish a monopoly of interests, the American rôle in the intervention assumed two general forms, each calculated in its way to preserve the railway as a lifeline for free commercial opportunity. This purpose was clearly expressed by President Wilson in July, 1919, in his instructions to Roland Morris, the American ambassador to Japan, then about to undertake a special mission to the White Russian government of Admiral Kolchak at Omsk.<sup>2</sup> In these instructions the president said in part: "I am also desirous that Ambassador Morris should so utilize his visit to Omsk as to impress upon the Japanese government our great interest in the Siberian situation and our intention to adopt a definite policy which will include the 'open door' to Russia free from Japanese domination."

The first expression of this intention in point of time was a plan to establish supervision over the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern railways in order to preserve the supply route to the Russian war front, to alleviate to some extent the internal economic chaos, and to prevent these railways from falling into the eager and outstretched hands of Japan. The second part of the American program was, as President Wilson defined its objectives, ancillary to the first though it was necessitated by the Japanese demands for a military intervention. This was the expeditionary force sent to Siberia under the command of Major General William Graves to serve as a forceful reminder of the American desire to preserve the open door in Siberia.

The principal railway mission sent to Russia from the United States, "The United States Railway Advisory Commission to Russia," was headed by John Stevens, an engineer of international experience and reputation. It was the duty of this group to inspect the railways of Russia and to make recommendations to the American government as well as to the Russian Provisional Government regarding improvements in service and equipment. Starting at the end of May, 1917, the Commission conducted an inspection lasting nearly two months and embodied its findings in a report which stressed the importance of the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern

<sup>2</sup>United States Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Russia*, Washington, 1937, p. 388.

railways in the transportation of supplies to the Russian war front, the necessity of making certain changes in railway operation methods in the interest of efficiency, and, finally, the urgency of some general Allied agreement that would guarantee the free operation of these railways.

It was not, however, until a year and a half later, on January 9, 1919, that the recommendations of John Stevens were implemented by the signing of the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement.<sup>3</sup> By this the Inter-Allied Railway Committee was established to exercise general control and to make policy decisions. Its membership included representatives appointed by the United States, Japan, China, Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia, and the Czechoslovaks. In practice the Inter-Allied Committee was little more than a front. The actual conduct of railway affairs was in the hands of the specialized boards which were administratively subordinate to it. The most important of these was the Technical Board presided over by John Stevens. Another was the Military Transportation Board, the president of which was chosen by Japan. The Inter-Allied Committee and its various boards and agencies functioned throughout the remainder of the Allied as well as the Japanese phases of the intervention. Its work was finally terminated in 1922, when the Japanese decided to give up their long and costly effort to gain control of the Russian Far East and withdrew their troops from Siberia.

The difficulties encountered by Stevens and the other railway experts resulted both from the nature of the railways themselves as well as from the surrounding confusion created by the civil war and intervention. The fact that the railways had been owned by the Imperial government, for example, raised both economic and social problems. In the first place, the deficits which constantly occurred in the financial balance of the railways had always been made up by the Imperial treasury. With the collapse of the government this was no longer possible and, consequently, not only did rolling stock fall into disrepair but salaries frequently remained unpaid or were inadequate in an inflationary period. In the second place, these poor conditions resulted in strikes which were not only a threat to regular railway service but served also as a means whereby the Bolsheviks could infiltrate the ranks and minds of the workers.

<sup>3</sup>United States Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia*, Washington, 1931, III, 301.



Another problem faced by the American railway experts was the vulnerability of the railway to Japanese encroachment. The chaos induced by the civil war and intervention and the apparent lack of interest on the part of almost all the contending parties in the successful operation of the railway, resulted in the constant deterioration of the latter as a business enterprise. In their desire to convert them to their exclusive use, the Japanese resorted sometimes to granting loans to the railways, sometimes to demands upon the Chinese government, and sometimes even to attempts at outright seizure. The poor financial condition of the railways made them particularly susceptible to the Japanese policy of attempting to gain possession by granting loans. Thus, through the South Manchurian Railway, credit was extended to the Russian lines for the purchase of coal. By the summer of 1921, the resulting debt was estimated at some 2,000,000 yen which the railway was then unable to pay.

Urged by the constant warnings from Stevens, Secretary of State Hughes gave his support to two separate projects aimed at alleviating this state of affairs, both of them, it must be added, unsuccessful. The first of these was an attempt to revise the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement of 1919 in order to concentrate greater power in the hands of John Stevens and the Technical Board. It was proposed to give the board full control over receipts and disbursements and over all railway personnel as well as power to fix tariffs. Opposition to any revision at all, especially from the Chinese government which saw its own legitimate interests in the Chinese Eastern Railway threatened, led in the end to the abandonment of all efforts to achieve it.

The second project sponsored by Secretary Hughes aimed at finding among the consortium powers sufficient support to float a loan of \$10,000,000 which Stevens considered indispensable to keep the railway functioning and free from encroachment by Japan. But with the refusal of the American group headed by J. P. Morgan and Company to participate, Hughes pursued the plan no further. His remarks on this occasion are significant for he said in part:<sup>4</sup> "The international importance of the Chinese Eastern Railway is quite obvious, and I had hoped that through adequate financial support it might be made an important instrumentality of our 'open door'

<sup>4</sup>United States Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1921*, Washington, 1936, I, 598.

policy." Thus, the preservation of the open door, the purpose which had impelled President Wilson to participate in the intervention in the first place, seemed unrealizable and, at the same time, the continuing opportunity for the development of monopoly interests appeared, in fact, almost inevitable.

The second phase of the American participation in the Siberian intervention was of a military nature. Though undesired by the United States, it was virtually forced into being by the insistence of the Allied powers, especially Japan. Because of the special interest of the United States in the Siberian part of the intervention in Russia, there developed a double and seemingly contradictory American policy regarding intervention. One of these policies pertained to North Russia where American forces cooperated with the British. The intervention here, though it deflected troops from the Western Front contrary to the desire of President Wilson, was nevertheless related to the war in Europe and therefore far more acceptable from the American point of view. The Siberian intervention, on the other hand, involving as it did the Japanese desire to expand into the Russian Far East and the American desire to prevent it, was fraught with the possibilities of a conflict in an area far from the European battle fronts. It was therefore a complete waste of military strength at a time when every effort was needed elsewhere. Thus, if the Japanese could not be prevented from landing forces in Siberia, it was desirable to limit as much as possible the scope of the intervention there.

It was the purpose of the document known as the *Aide Memoire*, written by President Wilson and intended to be the basic American policy in the Siberian intervention, to define and limit the scope of both military and political activities there.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, among its numerous, and in some cases contradictory, provisions, this document stipulated that the intervention should not involve "any interference of any kind with the political sovereignty of Russia, any interference in her internal affairs, or any impairment of her territorial integrity. . . ." Given this objective, it was the good fortune of the United States that Major General William Graves was selected to command the expeditionary force. A man of the staunchest principles who carried out his duties in the best traditions of the non-political soldier, General Graves became the instrument for effectu-

<sup>5</sup>United States Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia*, Washington, 1931, II, 287-290.

ating in Siberia the principle of non-interference in Russian affairs as defined in the *Aide Memoire*. In time his strict adherence to this neutral policy made Graves the object of a campaign of slander and outright attack by most of the parties to the struggle, including the Japanese, the British, and even the American State Department. Yet through it all it is clear that his policy was officially correct because he was firmly supported by the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, and by President Wilson himself. When at the Paris Peace Conference David Lloyd George tried to make it appear that Graves was the source of the inter-Allied conflicts in Siberia, President Wilson answered that Graves was "a man of most unprovocative character, and wherever the fault might lie, he felt sure it was not with him."

The American forces reached Siberia in August, 1918, and remained until April, 1920. Theoretically they were subordinate to the Japanese commander in Siberia but, in fact, General Graves refused to recognize any authority in the field superior to his own. This left him free to carry out the neutral policy to which his orders committed him. An example of his neutral policy occurred in the fall of 1919, when a car load of 50,000 rifles destined for Admiral Kolchak in Western Siberia was stopped by Ataman Semenov, one of the Japanese protégés in Siberia. The American officer in charge of the rifles wired Graves for instructions, explaining that Semenov was demanding 15,000 rifles for himself as the price of letting them pass. General Graves answered, "Do not give up," and the Japanese commander, General Oi, was forced to instruct Semenov to let them pass. Graves' determination to force this shipment through, it should be added, was an expression of a sense of duty rather than of any high regard for Kolchak whose weaknesses and hopeless future Graves appreciated fully. His impartiality was extended with equal determination to those accused of being Bolsheviks. In one case where a man had been arrested and charged with being a Bolshevik, Graves informed the officer who had made the arrest that: "Because a man is a Bolshevik is no reason for his arrest. . . . The United States is only fighting the Bolsheviks when the American troops are attacked by an armed force."<sup>6</sup> Unfortunately such impartiality was not always possible in the midst of a civil war, and the Americans were involved in a number of unhappy incidents while in Siberia.

<sup>6</sup>Carl W. Ackerman, *Trailing the Bolsheviks; Twelve Thousand Miles with the Allies in Siberia*, New York, 1919, p. 188.

The withdrawal of American troops was carried out two and a half years before the departure of the Japanese from the Siberian mainland and was done under circumstances which indicated almost no understanding or sympathy either in Congress or in the press for the purpose which had impelled President Wilson to send them there. The ambitions of Japan, to be sure, were understood and in some quarters even approved. Thus, the landing of Japanese forces at Vladivostok in April, 1918, was compared by Secretary of State Lansing with the use of American troops in the past to protect lives and property in Haiti, Nicaragua, and elsewhere. As for the ambitions of Japan in Siberia, the *Detroit Free Press* commented on January 27, 1921, that it was, after all, necessary for Japan to expand somewhere and continued: "If the Japanese go into Eastern Siberia and devote their energies to development of that country they are likely to look less longingly at the Philippines, and at Hawaii, and at South America, and at Australia, and at New Zealand, yes, and at the west coast of the United States."<sup>7</sup> Other periodicals added their approval of the Japanese program, while another group disapproved with equal vehemence.

Apart from the dispute over Japanese aims, however, the question as to just what part the American forces were playing in the intervention remained largely unanswered. The official explanation to the effect that our troops were there to cooperate with those of Japan was based to a large extent on its general acceptability during the war when the intervention began. At that time, when Allied unity was of crucial importance, cooperation with the Japanese was a sound slogan for any such venture. Furthermore, association with the Japanese was rendered even more popular by the close relationship that was widely believed to exist between their activities and the whole anti-Bolshevik cause. This in turn made it difficult to talk or think about the intervention as a separate issue. Thus, when Senator Hiram Johnson arose in the Senate in December, 1918, to challenge the Siberian policy of the Wilson administration he moved to the attack with the greatest caution.<sup>8</sup> In fact, he stated positively that he was not a Bolshevik and then continued: "It is because no Senator with whom I have talked, no public official of whom I have inquired, knows, because, indeed, we do not know and our people do not know, what we do or what we seek in Russia or

<sup>7</sup>*The Far Eastern Review* (Shanghai), XVII, No. 7, July, 1921, p. 419.

<sup>8</sup>United States, *Congressional Record*, Sixty-sixth Congress, First Session, Part III, pp. 3140-3141.

what our ultimate purpose is, that I present my resolution and these remarks."

It was as a result of the inquiry thus opened and the press response that followed, that the end of American participation in the intervention was brought about. With the end of the war, cooperation with Japan, the basis upon which President Wilson had found it necessary to rest his case for the undertaking, became in time an unpopular cause. On the other hand, to state openly that American troops were in Siberia to prevent Japanese aggression would have endangered our outwardly peaceful relations with Japan. In the end, therefore, the case could not be fought out on its merits and withdrawal remained the only alternative. Withdrawal was accordingly decided upon, and the last of the American forces sailed from Vladivostok on April 1, 1920, while a Japanese band on the docks played, "Hard Times Come Again No More."



# American Impressions\*

BY M. M. KOVALEVSKY

I VISITED the United States of America twice—in 1881, and then again twenty years later.

I paid my first visit to that country in the course of a two years' research mission abroad. After one year in Italy and six months in Spain, I decided to spend the remaining time on the other side of the ocean. I chose a most unfavorable season for the passage—early spring. In mid-ocean our ship encountered icebergs which chilled our course for many hours but failed to cause any panic. The sea was stormy throughout the voyage. A few hours after boarding the ship at Liverpool, I already lay prostrate in my cabin. When a few days later I was aroused and warned to keep ready because icebergs had been sighted, I was in such a condition that I only shrugged. The rolling and pitching was such that I was hardly able to raise myself high enough to have a look at the icebergs through the porthole. They were sweeping along at prodigious speed at about one-two miles from our ship. After two hours, a milder temperature made us aware that they were receding. I was so exhausted by seasickness and the inability to keep down food that I spent day after day in a kind of doze. The voyage lasted ten days; and only when we were nearing the shores of America did the sea calm down, and I was able to dress and go up on deck. The entry into the Hudson Bay was tremendously impressive.

On my second voyage, in 1901, our ship already saluted the Statue of Liberty which in the intervening years had been received as a gift from France and now adorned the entrance to the Port of New York. Among the passengers there were people to whom this salute meant more than an empty symbol and whose faces betrayed their emotion. It was therefore with some astonishment that I read, some time ago, the following passage in an interesting novel by Hertzog: "Bow to this statue—in it you see the image of liberty for the last time!" That anyone should get the impression in America that the country lacks freedom, of all things, seems rather odd—unless one

\*These excerpts from Professor Kovalevsky's reminiscences were written in 1914-15 in Karlsbad, where he was interned. They are published here for the first time through the courtesy of the author's family and are to be continued in subsequent issues of *The Russian Review*. [Ed.].

regards the "almighty dollar" as the most ruthless of tyrants. Yet even if this were so, one should keep in mind that nowhere else there are so many opportunities to acquire that dollar through any kind of work—and this without any loss of self-respect.

In these random reminiscences I do not feel bound to stick to a definite plan and itinerary and to set down my impressions in the order I received them. And so I allow myself to record at the very beginning a feature of American life that impressed me deeply: no kind of work is considered degrading. A lawyer, an engineer, will think nothing of going to work in a factory if he finds himself out of funds. A student may "work his way through college" as newspaper vendor in the railway stations or as gaslamp-lighter in the streets. I once advised the son of a Russian immigrant to quit the University of Chicago and to continue his studies in Europe. "Impossible!" he said. "Here I earn enough money every night extinguishing gas-lamps to pay for my tuition and to help my parents. How my fellow-students in Berlin or Oxford would look down on me if they knew!"

European readers are familiar with descriptions of New York as a city growing upwards, into the air. Rows of twenty-storied buildings turn the streets into drafty passages. All this grew up during the last quarter of a century. On my first visit, I found New York a very beautiful big city with broad avenues and fine parks. It had a rather neglected embankment along the Hudson, a monstrously long bridge connecting Manhattan and Brooklyn, and some historical monuments dating mostly from the Dutch era. Twenty years later, Wall Street—the counterpart of Lombard Street in London—had already become that narrow corridor between tall houses of twenty stories and more, so well-known from advertisements of American firms. A river front was under construction. Lovely verdant parks charmed the traveller in all parts of the city.

Since the business side of American life interested me least, and what I looked for was an answer to the question of how American civilization and American character as embodied in the country's social and political institutions had evolved—I devoted myself, both in 1881 and 1901, mainly to studying of the educational system from top to bottom, to visiting picture galleries, museums, libraries,

literary clubs, and to frequenting people prominent in literature and journalism. When I first arrived, I carried introductory letters from Turgenev and his Anglo-American friends. Among the latter was Henry James, the author of the famous novel *The American*; he referred me to Boilsen, the best expert on Goethe in the United States. Through him I met many writers and scholars in Boston, Baltimore, and Washington. My itinerary took me to all the Eastern states, with the exception of Maine in the North and Florida in the South. Farther West, I visited Illinois and Ohio. After a few weeks in Chicago, I went on to Richmond, Va., and from there to New Orleans. Here the French Consul, Vicomte d'Abzac, and the American writer Keble, whom I had met aboard ship, became for me the tools of Providence, showing me such aspects of American life as usually remain hidden from the tourist's eyes.

My second visit, 1901, which took me chiefly to the Western states on the Pacific coast, provided me with material for a comparison between the centuries-old culture of the East—that is, the narrow strip between the Atlantic and the Alleghenies—and the thin layer of Anglo-American civilization on top of a Spanish-Indian past, constantly breaking through, such as found in Oregon and California. This contrast underlies and explains the elusive variations of the American national character in the different regions of the vast continent stretching from coast to coast and from Canada in the North to Mexico in the South.

If you ask a New Englander, especially one of the wealthy and cultured upper class, educated at Harvard or Yale, how he would characterize the way of life of his friends and neighbors, you will hear more often than not: "Haven't you got the feeling here of living in the British provinces, somewhere around Bath, Oxford, or Cambridge? Or even more so—in the puritan part of Scotland, somewhere near Edinburgh?" And indeed, the outward pattern of life is more or less the same. Harvard, when I visited it forty years ago, had the system of students residing in colleges, so typical of the old English universities. Tutors, however, play a lesser part here, and Harvard professors, unlike many great scholars of Oxford and Cambridge, do not have to complain of lecturing to empty benches. It is easier, to be sure, to prepare for examinations under the direction of a tutor strictly adhering to the program than through attending lectures by independent researchers who open up new horizons. The tutor is a kind of scholastic nanny; he gives the young student

just what he needs to pass and nothing beyond that. Freeman once complained to me that while his original lectures, which he was preparing for publication, were attended by five-six students at most, a college tutor was giving a course in historical geography, using an old textbook of his, before crowded benches. I did not find the same system at Harvard. I was primarily interested in the teaching of law and used to drop in on lectures in civil law and procedure. The classrooms were filled to overflowing. However, it was not always easy to make out the subject of the lecture. The professor would interrupt himself, calling up this or that listener and asking him what decision should be given in such and such case on the basis of legal precedent. And yet this was not considered a seminar but a lecture. The training for the bar—which in England takes place outside the universities, within the Lincoln Corporation and the Inner Temple—is here an integral part of the teaching of law within the University itself. At least, so it was in 1881. Since then, the tendency to imitate German universities has probably brought about changes, and the Harvard Law School may have introduced legal courses similar to those on the continent of Europe and in Russia.

Harvard possessed an excellent library in a great many languages. Dr. Smith who was showing me about, himself a noted philologist, took me to a room filled entirely with books in the Russian language. "Have you many here who read in Russian?" I asked him. "No one so far," was the answer, "but who can vouch that in the next generation there may not be a hundred students desirous to read Russian books?"

Harvard, like the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, owes its existence mainly to private endowments. It still grows and thrives on private gifts. On my second journey through the United States, I spent a whole night on a train in order to call on a lady unknown to me—the owner of a luxurious estate named by her "Verona" because its front lawn was adorned with an antique stone fountain she had brought over from Verona in Italy. Her antiquarian hobby cost her a pretty penny: she let herself be persuaded that her millions were best used to foster the love of antiquity in America through the creation of three chairs—two at Harvard, in Egyptology and Indian archeology, and one at the State University of California. I was called upon to help in exhorting her. My mission was successful, and I had the gratification of having rendered an easy service to the science of antiquity.

Harvard, of course, has nothing like Oxford's magnificent buildings going back to the times of the Tudors and Stuarts, nor does one see here those black-gowned "dons"—doctors, masters and bachelors of every field of learning—strolling through the narrow streets of the English University towns. And yet, to go to Harvard is as much an honor and distinction for the son of a prosperous American, as to study at Oxford or Cambridge for the scion of any noble English family. A wealthy manufacturer of Chicago, for instance, while showering rich gifts on the university of his native city, will yet prefer to send his son to Harvard,—convinced that nowhere else in America will he find such a high level not only of scholarship but also of manners and breeding, and acquire an all-round education as much through contacts with young men of distinguished and cultured families as through attending lectures by famous scholars.

Harvard is as true to the classical tradition as Oxford and Cambridge. The young American receives here the same grounding in the humanities as the British undergraduate and as much attention is being paid to his physical activities, with the difference that football and similar ballgames take the place of tennis. The whole way of life in the neighborhood of Harvard—not only in the American Cambridge but even farther away in Boston—reminded me of the professors' families with whom I had made my home in Britain. In Oxford, they would invite me on Sundays to share the family pew. And in Boston, the proprietor of my hotel, to show me his goodwill, took me along with him to his church and made me listen to an interminable and deadly tedious sermon. Family trips to the country reminded me of the visiting between the families of English squires. Food played an important part in these neighborly invasions, the meals following each other in rigid order—breakfasts, lunches, and dinners with their inevitable libations and cheerful table talk, often lasting late into the night. The whole pattern of life was English and unfolded itself against a landscape very English in character—well-cultivated fields, groves, widely scattered country-houses and farms. However, there were unexpected gaps in the English pattern. I realized this when I heard that at the fashionable hotel next to mine the guests had threatened the proprietor to quit immediately if he dared admit a deputy who happened to be colored. This fact greatly surprised me, since the British press had accustomed me to regard anti-Negro prejudice as a sad legacy of the antebellum era which survived only in the South. How deep-rooted this prejudice was, I discovered during my stay in Baltimore. When I asked the



colored servant who waited on me to let me accompany him to his church attended exclusively by Negroes, he said: "I'd be glad to, Master,—but who'll speak to you tomorrow when this becomes known?"

The farther you go South or West from New England, the less you can think of the United States as the continuation of the "Old Country"—the mother country of the first settlers. Richmond, Va., however, is still very English—for wasn't Virginia the oldest English colony? It is even one of the most charming centers of English-style life in America, far removed from the commercial and industrial hustle and bustle of such places as Chicago, Pittsburgh, or Cleveland,—here life is enjoyed instead of being spent on getting rich.

A few hours after I arrived in Richmond, I received an invitation, accompanied with a bunch of magnolias, to afternoon tea in the modest home of a Russian compatriot who, for reasons unknown to me, had settled in Richmond years ago, had married an American, and was by now thoroughly americanized. He was teaching French and his wife was teaching English literature in the local high-schools. Around their tea-table a group of Virginians were gathered—well-bred people, speaking exquisite English, without those nasal sounds so typical of American speech. The talk was about literature, about the interest aroused by the English translations of Turgenev's works, but also of the devastation of the South by the Northern armies, and the intolerable conditions created by the enforced equality of the Negroes and the rule of the Yankees. One of the guests invited me to his home, promising to show me something I had never seen. This "something" turned out to be a room whose walls were papered from top to bottom with Confederate money which had lost all value.

Between Boston and Richmond, I stopped in many places, sometimes for weeks, working in libraries and meeting representative Americans. Both in Philadelphia and Washington I spent much time in the company of people whose appearance and habits were familiar to me from my many visits to England. In Washington, the home of the historian Henry Adams, member of a distinguished family which had given the country one of its first presidents, was, of course, wholly English in character. Adams himself had been attached for a time to the American Embassy in London. His wife, though American, had a predilection for everything English. They were wealthy people who lived comfortably and knew everybody worth knowing.

All the people I met at their house possessed the refinement and manners of the English upper classes. And yet very soon I discovered a notable deviation from English psychology. When I asked the host: "Why don't you offer yourself as a candidate in the coming elections?" he said: "It is obvious that you have come straight from England! Why should I, a man of means and social position mingle with a crowd of political adventurers feathering their nests through all kind of shady deals with stockholding companies and multi-millionaires? When their embezzlements get too much publicity, they are replaced by others. The only worthwhile office in this country is that of President. But as you know, it is occupied. To give you a better idea of how Americans regard those who in England are called "Right Honorable," I'll have you meet a prominent New Yorker who has consented to represent his city in Congress. Come to dinner tomorrow." The next night, in full evening dress, I sat at the hostess' right, opposite Mr. Hewitt, Congressman from New York. The host asked him whether he thought that his election to Congress had raised him in the opinion of his fellow-citizens. Not at all, Mr. Hewitt admitted with a smile. Formerly they would say of him with hearty approval "Mr. Hewitt minds his own business," but now they were wondering why he had got himself into such bad company. "You will see for yourself when you visit the House," he said to me, "that speeches have very little effect. The real work is done in the committees whose decisions are mostly adopted by the House without serious discussion. And to what pressures the committee members are exposed, you probably know from the innumerable angry articles and pamphlets that have been published lately."

Washington at that time—that is, over thirty years ago—was a beautiful city with wide streets and elegant houses that did not attempt to reach the sky and often were surrounded with gardens. Were it not for the Capitol, the Smithsonian Institution, the White House, Washington might have been taken for a fashionable cosmopolitan resort whose wise administrators had done everything to make life pleasant. One thing they had been unable to change: the climate. Every summer the murderous heat causes the exodus of fashionable society—to the seashore, to magnificent Saratoga which vies in luxury with such places as Ostende, Trouville, Biarritz. The heat may be one of the minor causes why people with money and position tend to avoid the halls of Congress and prefer to keep there those to whom politics has become a profession. The

main cause, however, is the organization of party life—with its “machines,” “rings,” “bosses,” etc.—so vividly described by our own compatriot Ostrogorsky in his book *Democracy and Political Parties*, to say nothing of the classical work by Lord Bryce *The American Commonwealth*. Of course, political intrigue and organizations aiming at the manipulation of the popular vote are to be found not only in the United States. However, these practices, of which both Britain and France are beginning to complain, are doubtlessly of American origin. Political corruption got hold first of the Federal organs and crept from there into the most populous states which carry the greatest weight in presidential elections. It is therefore more in evidence in New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts than in such states as Maryland or Delaware. Having gradually gained control of Congressional and then of state elections, the system of rings and bosses at last took possession of the municipal elections. Things went from bad to worse, until at last the voters themselves took the matter into their own hands and initiated a counter-organization with the purpose to fight the multiple, often elusive forms of political corruption. Little is known abroad about this movement. During my first stay it was still in the embryonic stage. Much was being talked and written about the necessity of “civil service reform,” but little was done. Twenty years later, I found already in existence—in Chicago as well as in some other cities—a series of political clubs whose sole purpose was the cleaning up of elections. Their methods were rather unconventional and characteristic of a country which has no legacy of chivalry and is therefore free from the prejudice which considers that by challenging one’s foe to a duel one can remove any stain from one’s honor. Mr. Crane, one of the initiators of the movement and the financial backer of the Club operating in Chicago, acquainted me with some of the methods used by his Club’s administration to prevent any patently dishonest politician from standing for reelection. They write him a letter which runs like this: “Kindly explain why you did vote thus and thus in this or that case. According to information in our hands, you did it from the following motives. If you fail to prove us wrong, we shall publish all we know about you.”—“And no one ever threatened you with a duel?” I asked. “The very idea! Why, this is America,” was the answer. “The place for duelists is in the madhouse. Once we were threatened with a suit for libel, but we let the man know that we were in possession of still other incriminating material we had not mentioned and which

we were ready to publish—and we heard nothing more from him.” “And is your—pardon me—blackmail in a good cause always successful?” “Not always, alas! One popular Saloon-owner got the better of us. He supplied his voters not only with cheap liquor but also with money, advised them in their difficulties, fixed all kind of deals for them and made himself generally so indispensable in his ward that no threat of revelations could scare him, and he won the next election with flying colors.”

*(To be continued)*

# Dostoevsky's Literary Reputation

BY RENÉ FUELOEP-MILLER

SCARCELY any of Dostoevsky's contemporaries understood the significance of his work. All the other great novelists of the nineteenth century moved in the same circles and recognized each other's greatness.

Balzac, his fame already secure, discovered the still unknown Stendhal, and when Balzac and Stendhal strolled down the boulevard of their "Parisian Olympus," each knew he walked with a fellow immortal. Turgenev in his youth had sat in on Gogol's lectures at the University of Petersburg. Flaubert, Zola, and Turgenev were friends who attended together those "banquets of the gods" held by the intellectual élite of France, the famous *diners chez Magny*. Sitting together, they would indulge in spirited debates and exchange ideas about the form and content of the realistic novel. The reporters of the French Olympus, the brothers Goncourt, preserved for posterity every word of these conversations.

In Dostoevsky's life there were no such strolls, no such literary dinner conversations with his intellectual peers.

"All of us have come out of Gogol's '*Cloak*,'" Dostoevsky wrote. But at the time he wrote these words the author of "The Cloak"—that tale in which the neglected common man made his début in Russian literature—was already insane and knew nothing of the author who had stepped out from under his cloak to write *The Double*, the man destined to advance Russian realism.

Balzac, whom Dostoevsky admired for the tremendous comprehensiveness of his mind, "which evolved not from the spirit of the age, but the spiritual struggles of millennia"—Balzac knew nothing at all about the young officer at the Petersburg military academy who was practicing his craft by translating *Eugénie Grandet*.

Dickens was singled out by Dostoevsky as the only contemporary writer with a Christian heart. For a while Dostoevsky tried to write in imitation of him. At the time Dickens was winning fame for the greatness and novelty of his descriptions of urban misery, a Russian tourist was studying that misery in Whitechapel. Dickens could not know that this very Russian was destined to surpass him in the grimness of his descriptions of poverty and the life of great cities, and in his still more Christian heart.



At that time Turgenev, the illustrious foreigner at the *diners chez Magny*, was considered the literary ambassador of the "Russian man," who for long was thought of as the "Turgenevian type of man."

Flaubert, his attention called to Tolstoy by Turgenev, devoted a letter to discussing the weaknesses and strong points of *War and Peace*. Yet none of the great French novelists knew anything about Dostoevsky, who was at that time in Paris on his second European tour. In discussions on the art of the novel his name was never mentioned, although he had already written *Notes from Underground*. When years later Zola read *Crime and Punishment* he viewed it merely as a regrettable deviation toward the pernicious metaphysical tendency against which he had always fought.

Hawthorne died peacefully in an inn at Plymouth, New Hampshire, in 1864, without ever knowing that in the distant, half-Asiatic East he had a brother in spirit who profoundly shared his basic concern with the power of sin and the force of redemption. At that time Dostoevsky was working on *Crime and Punishment*.

Even at home the literary importance of this great son of Russia was recognized late, almost too late. After the storm of praise for Dostoevsky's first novel, *Poor Folk*, had died down, and after he had been condemned to a decade of namelessness, he had to starve his way to success slowly and painfully. Until the last he remained the worst paid of contemporary recognized authors. Real fame was granted him only a few months before his death, at the Pushkin celebration.

Like his tormented life, woven of the sublime and the ridiculous, the realistic and the fantastic, his posthumous life in men's minds was as full of paradox as one of his novels. His funeral, with which his immortality began, sounds like a scene straight out of one of his novels.

The Street of the Smiths in the Petersburg workers quarter where Dostoevsky lived at the time of his death was jammed with one black mass of mourners, all of whom wanted to rush up the steps to his apartment at the same time. In the study in the little flat, where the body lay on its bier, trodden papers and pamphlets were strewn all over the floor. Men and women, their faces streaming with tears, elbowed their way to the bier to get a close view of the dead man. The throng behind them shoved them against the coffin, which began to wobble, so that the body almost fell to the floor, where it would surely have been trampled. Just in time Dostoevsky's widow, who

stood with her two children squeezed between the table and the wall, rushed, screaming in horror, to the coffin, and held it firm. So close was the air in the little room that all the candles went out, until at last only the flickering lamp in front of the ikons was burning. A fresh crowd from the stairway burst into the room. "At that moment I suddenly had a vision," writes Melchior de Vogüé, who was present at this scene. "The mass of mourners seemed to me to take on familiar names and appearances. Dostoevsky's imagination had described them in books, but now they stood living before me and took part in this grotesque scene. All his characters seemed to have come to torment him even after death, to pay their rude respects to him, even if this had to be done at the price of profaning this revered man. He, of course, would certainly have known how to appreciate so excessive a mode of paying homage."

In order to honor the deceased genius, Church and State decided to hold a semi-official funeral at which the Court, the government, the clergy, and other important institutions would be represented. Then the chief of police heard that radical students were planning to make a political demonstration by carrying behind the coffin "the chains of the convict Dostoevsky," who had been a victim of Tsarist injustice. At the time Russia was in political ferment; the government feared that Dostoevsky's burial might become a signal for a revolutionary uprising. It was on the point of calling off the semi-official funeral, but at the last moment decided to go ahead with the original plan.

As the cortège of mourners approached the Alexander Nevsky Monastery, where the coffin was to be placed in the church, the gates of the monastery opened, and the monks marched out in solemn procession—an honor ordinarily reserved for a Tsar's funeral.

Dostoevsky's widow was turned away from the church gates by the guards when she came to attend the mass. The guards told her she was the third alleged "widow" of Dostoevsky who had tried to get in. Fortunately, a high official recognized Anna Grigorievna and she was allowed to enter.

At midnight the Metropolitan of Petersburg appeared in the church to deliver a prayer for the dead. Looking down into the nave of the church, he saw to his alarm that the elegant dignitaries, deputies, and merchants were overwhelmingly outnumbered by a mass of nihilists, men with plaids thrown over their shoulders, bespectacled women with short hair, servants, beggars, tramps, the whole host of the insulted and injured. Frightened and unsteady,

the monks' voices rose in the singing of the psalms. But then these nihilistic atheist students took over and sang; a tremendous chorus resounded in the church and the hymns were sung "more movingly and beautifully than they had ever before been heard in a Russian church."

A hundred thousand people stood along the curbs and twenty thousand followed the coffin with crosses and waving banners. At the grave, young princes and grand dukes, resplendent priests, workers and vagrants, conservatives and radicals, leaders of the Slavophiles and the Westerners, mourned together. All Russia had come to Dostoevsky's grave to honor in the dead man the revolutionary fighter for freedom, the spokesman of the conservatives, the friend of the heir apparent and the brother of the downtrodden proletarian.

Posterity instituted proceedings to decide upon Dostoevsky's literary immortality. The arguments went on, across graves, decades, continents, and oceans. Voices out of the Victorian and Tsarist age, out of world wars, revolutions, made themselves heard, some ecstatic, some irritated, some enthusiastic, some scornful; voices from Scotland, from Russian estates, from resorts on the Riviera, from Californian villas, from the Paris cafés of the literati, London clubs, doctors' offices, voices from editors' desks, politburos, scholars' studies, National Socialist Chambers of Culture—all confirming or contradicting one another.

Tolstoy, "the sage of Yasnaya Polyana," was the first to take the floor. He had neglected to meet Dostoevsky, although the two men were once in the same auditorium, listening to a lecture by the philosopher Vladimir Soloviev. He had not written to Dostoevsky whose appreciative review of *Anna Karenina* contributed a great deal to the success of that novel. Tolstoy himself had stayed away from the Pushkin celebration, in which all the other writers of Russia took part in order to celebrate Dostoevsky's as well as Pushkin's greatness. But now that Dostoevsky was dead, Tolstoy exclaimed regretfully: "A support has been torn from me. I realized clearly for the first time how dear he was to me and I have not yet ceased to mourn his loss. . . . Usually the intellect and artistic gift of others awakens envy in me, but I have always felt differently toward Dostoevsky's work. Everything he did was so good that the more he wrote the better I felt about it. And it never occurred to me to match my work against his, never. . . ."

Later on, however, Tolstoy wavered in his judgment of Dostoev-

sky. He remarked that Turgenev would outlive Dostoevsky. But after he had turned his back on art and rejected all the productions of belles lettres, including his own, Dostoevsky's works were the only ones he would tolerate. The night before his flight he was rereading the chapter about Elder Zossima in *The Brothers Karamazov*.

The German philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche, followed Tolstoy to the witness stand. In 1887, in Nice, where he completed his *The Will to Power*, he came across the newly-published French translation of *Notes from Underground*. "What a lucky find!" he exclaimed. "It was a chance similar to what happened to me with Schopenhauer when I was twenty-one and with Stendhal when I was thirty-five. The voice of the blood (what else can one call it?) made itself heard so clearly, and my joy was immense."

And afterwards, when he read *Crime and Punishment*, he recognized that: "Dostoevsky is the only psychologist who has anything to teach me. I consider my acquaintance with his works one of the finest strokes of luck in my life, even better than my discovery of Stendhal."

The Danish literary historian, Georg Brandes, "who from his desk in Copenhagen observed with a hundred keen eyes all the events in literature and noted them down with brilliant succinctness," questioned Nietzsche's enthusiasm. He wrote to the philosopher: "Admittedly he is a great writer, but an abhorrent individual, at one and the same time wholly Christian in feeling and thoroughly sadistic. His morality is precisely what you, dear master, have called the slave-morality."

"What you say about Dostoevsky agrees perfectly with my opinion," Nietzsche replied. "But on the other hand, I esteem Dostoevsky for providing the most valuable psychological material I know. I owe him a great debt of gratitude, even though he is opposed to my most deep-seated instincts. He still remains one of those who has afforded the greatest relief to my mind."

Then the Scotch novelist, Robert Louis Stevenson, offered his testimony. During his visit to the United States, while he was staying at Lake Saranac in the winter of 1887, he read the newly-published English translation of *Crime and Punishment*. "It is easily the greatest book I have read in ten years," he wrote. "Many find it dull; Henry James would not finish it; all I can say is: it nearly finished me."

Henry James refused to be infected by Stevenson's enthusiasm.

He thought of Dostoevsky's novels as a liquid, lukewarm pudding, though having a certain amount of taste because it had received a portion of the mind and soul of the author.

Anglo-Saxon contemporaries could not agree with each other. John Galsworthy, the chronicler of English society, was shocked by this very realism which felt no shame about prying into the secret hearts of men. He said: "What incoherence and verbiage, and what starting of monsters out of holes to make you shudder. Everybody goes about turning out their inmost hearts at the top of their voices."

"I only wish all English novelists would learn from Dostoevsky," Arnold Bennett replied to this. And E. M. Forster affirmed: "No English novelist explored man's soul as deeply as Dostoevsky."

Yeats called Dostoevsky the "greatest portrayer of men." Havelock Ellis named him "the most Christian of writers." "A thoroughly unclean and perverse Christ who sins his way to God," D. H. Lawrence growled. "It would be possible to call the whole mass of Dostoevsky's writings 'The Fifth Gospel'—the Gospel according to the soul of Russia," John Cowper Powys replied to this. "To my mind," he went on, "Dostoevsky is as much greater than all other novelists as Homer and Shakespeare than all other poets. He is a greater psychologist, a greater prophet, and a greater thinker."

On the other hand, Joseph Conrad hated Dostoevsky so much that at the mere mention of the Russian's name his face would turn beet-red, he would begin to shake with fury and he remarked brusquely: "There is a certain foul stench emanating from Dostoevsky's works that I cannot endure."

The French critics have repudiated their Russian ambassador, Melchior de Vogüé, who introduced Dostoevsky to France, but who gravely underestimated both Dostoevsky's importance and his appeal to the Gallic mind.

Huysmans, the author of the famous *Là Bas*, said, in spite of his admiration for his master, Zola: "We must travel the main path that Zola took, but we must also look for the parallel route that Dostoevsky has showed us, which takes the air-line of the mind to that reality which is concealed behind things. In a word, we must go along the road of his 'spiritual naturalism.'"

Marcel Proust, whose characters represent the sharpest antitheses to the Dostoevskian types, speaks with reverence of the "great creative genius" of the Russian novelists. "Dostoevsky's 'buffoons'



who appear again and again, all his Lebedevs, Karamazovs, Ivolgins, that procession of incredible people, are more fantastic than the figures in Rembrandt's Night Watch," Proust declares. "And yet it is all steeped in profound and extraordinary truths which are peculiar to Dostoevsky alone."

André Gide's evaluation commands respect not only in France, but in the entire literary world. "There never was an author more Russian in the strictest sense of the word and yet so universally European. *The Brothers Karamazov* is the greatest novel ever written. But everything that Dostoevsky ever wrote is worth reading and must be read. Nothing can be safely omitted."

Albert Camus, speaking for the existentialists, has the highest appreciation for Dostoevsky. He writes of the "direct line from Sophocles' King Oedipus to Dostoevsky's Kirilov who combines classical wisdom with modern heroism."

The German witnesses congregate into a Dostoevsky church. His name is sacred to them. They have chosen his doctrine of the "Russian Christ" as a German religion. His works are to their minds "the new Genesis of the fall of man," "the new Gospel," the "new Apocalypse"; his effect is a "new Pentecostal miracle."

But wherever there is a church there are sure to be heretics. These condemn the wildness, the dangerous inchoateness and amorality of Dostoevsky's doctrines, the nullification of all discipline and form in literature, and his complete remoteness from nature.

"Undoubtedly Dostoevsky is a gifted artist, in spite of the monstrosities in his works," Nobel prize winner Hesse says. "But that European and particularly German youth should feel Dostoevsky to be their greatest writer, not Goethe, not even Nietzsche—that is a fateful and troubling fact. For the ideal of the Karamazovs, an ancient, Asiatic, occult ideal, is beginning to be Europeanized, is beginning to devour the mind of Europe. That I must call the decline of Europe."

"Dostoevsky dwells outside the realm of things," Ramuz, the great Swiss novelist, declares, "outside the seasons, outside the sky and the tides. There is no writer who shows greater poverty in landscape-painting. Nature is missing altogether from his works. A thorough urbanite, he lacked the freedom with which the healthy man moves over the surface of the earth. Epileptic or not, he lives only in—fits. I once loved him passionately; today I find him alien."

The opinion of Stefan Zweig, the Austrian, is easily available, for

it has been translated into every important language. Zweig has a wonderful gift for feeling his way to the heart of another man's work. He and Gide were the first to appreciate the full human and literary importance of Dostoevsky.

The Russians take the floor, the Merezhkovskys, Bulgakovs, Bloks, Berdyaevs, Ivanovs, and Leonovs. They alone really know how great he was, for his greatness is after all the greatness of Russia itself. They praise him as "the genius of compassionate Russian humanitarianism."

"The genius of compassionate Russian humanitarianism? A cruel talent! An evil genius!" thunders the voice of a dissenting Russian who bears the name "the bitter one." He is Maxim Gorky. "We need mental health and not Dostoevsky's morbid pessimism," he rants. "An enemy of progress. . . . I call upon all morally healthy people who realize the necessity for a healthy Russian life to protest against the performance of Dostoevsky's *Possessed*."

The morbid, evil, and reactionary elements in Dostoevsky are brought up for examination. Professor Freud, the renowned authority in matters of the mind, concurs: "Dostoevsky failed to become a teacher and liberator of mankind; instead he joined forces with humanity's jailers. The cultural future of mankind will have little to thank him for."

"Before the man's greatness as a writer," Freud concludes, "analysis must, however, lay down its arms. As a writer Dostoevsky has a place not far beneath Shakespeare's. *The Brothers Karamazov* is the most masterly novel ever written; the episode of the Grand Inquisitor is one of the supreme achievements of world literature, something that can scarcely be surpassed."

Thomas Mann speaks next. He combines a keen analytic methodology with the artist's instinctive grasp of spiritual greatness. He considers the stated question: "Was Dostoevsky a pathological and evil genius, and was he the enemy of progressive humanism?" Thomas Mann rejects the charge that Dostoevsky is anti-cultural. As for the morbid and evil elements in Dostoevsky, he says: "I am filled with reverence, a deep, mystical reverence, before the religious greatness of the damned, before the genius of disease and the disease of genius, before this prototype of the downtrodden and possessed in whom the saint and the criminal are one." And one of our foremost contemporaries and scientists, Professor Albert

Einstein, declares: "Dostoevsky means more to me than any scientist. He gives me ethical satisfaction."

"Dostoevsky?—Asiatic pestilence. Betrayal of the German spirit to a race-polluted spirit. Alien corruption of German culture by the wild hordes of the East. For the sake of the health of our racial spirit—ban him, burn him," a screeching voice repeats on a phonograph record, amplified through a loudspeaker: the voice of the German Chamber of Culture under the direction of Joseph Goebbels.

"Just as during his lifetime, also now Dostoevsky stands in the vanguard of reaction. His works are being exploited widely and universally in the frenzied campaign against man undertaken by Wall Street's literary lackeys. And it is natural that this should be so, because Dostoevsky wasted the entire force of his talent on proving the weakness, insignificance, and vulgarity of human nature. . . . This type of literature seeks to corrupt the souls of men, crush their will to struggle, and justify the insane violations to which the rulers of the bourgeois world are subjecting people." It is the proxy voice of Andrei Zhdanov of the Russian Politburo; at the moment he is employing the obedient vocal cords of Vladimir Yermilov, the critic of the militant *Literary Gazette*.

"Down with the idealization of Dostoevsky, the spiritual father of double dealing treachery," shouts the powerful voice of David Zaslavsky, bringing his schoolmaster's cane down hard on the fingers of the Kirpotins and Dolinins, who have been trying to give Dostoevsky a coat of ideological whitewash.

Time has the last word. But time, which reserves for itself the final decision on a man's value and importance, is also the most unpredictable of judges. At one moment it listens to one side, the next to the other, and its standards may change with each succeeding generation. It praises what it once rejected or overlooked, revokes past approval and often suspends judgment for centuries before the final decision.

# Alexander Isvolsky and the Buchlau Conference

BY KENNETH I. DAILEY

SMARTING under the humiliation of defeat and embarrassed by the Revolution of 1905, the Russian government set out to reestablish its prestige and its national honor by pursuing an ambitious foreign policy in Europe. In May, 1906, Tsar Nicholas II chose as his minister of Foreign Affairs the career diplomat, Alexander Petrovich Isvolsky. He had been highly recommended to the Tsar by Edward VII of England and his reputation had been enhanced by his opposition to the Far Eastern adventure.

Isvolsky hoped to reorient Russian policy toward a complete understanding with England and a sincere reconciliation with Japan. In this he was successful. A further desire, which became almost an obsession with Isvolsky, was to get free passage through the Straits for Russian warships. Preliminary discussion on this matter had been carried on with both the British and the Austro-Hungarian governments.<sup>1</sup> As late as the spring of 1908, Isvolsky had made little headway. The British admitted the justice of his desire but put him off with excuses about popular reaction to such an agreement in England. The Austro-Hungarian government was non-committal.

Like Isvolsky, his Austrian counterpart, the Baron Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal was an ambitious career diplomat. His long diplomatic service at St. Petersburg made him an accepted expert on Russian affairs. One of a group of younger noblemen who deeply resented the subordinate position of the Dual Monarchy in the affairs of Europe, he hoped to conduct an aggressive foreign policy aimed at ending the irritating dependence on Germany. If successful it would serve to wipe out the blot of having lost every major Austrian conflict since the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. He was supported in his course by the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the chief-of-staff Conrad von

<sup>1</sup>Sir Sidney Lee, *King Edward VII, A Biography*, II, p. 283; Grey of Falloden, *Twenty Five Years, 1892-1916*, I, p. 179; and *Die Grosse Politik des Europäischen Kabinetts*, XXII, Nos. 7383 and 7385, hereinafter cited as *Die Grosse Politik*.

Hotzendorf, and by the Roman Catholic Church.<sup>2</sup> The only avenue of expansion was southward into the Balkan peninsula where Serbia and Montenegro could be engulfed and Albanian and Bulgarian satellites would be created.<sup>3</sup>

Such an ambitious Austrian policy was certain to result in conflicts with the aims and aspirations of Imperial Russia. This was not long in coming. Early in 1908, Aehrenthal announced plans for the construction of a railroad through the Sanjak of Novi Bazar to Mitroviza. The Russian government immediately protested this action as a violation of the Murtzeg program of 1903 which had maintained the *status quo* in the Balkans. The Western powers were also disconcerted by this move. They considered it to be a violation of the concert of Europe for one of its members to seek such a privilege from the Sultan of Turkey while they were trying to make him grant substantial reforms in Macedonia. Omitting the details of this question, it is sufficient to say that the matter of the Sanjak railway set off a series of exchanges between St. Petersburg and Vienna.

In the third Russian *aide-memoire* of this series, Isvolsky, who by this time had despaired of getting any substantial agreement in the matter of the Straits from the British, set the stage for the Buchlau meeting. After having expressed complete agreement with Austria-Hungary in the matter of the Balkan railroad he suggested talks about the Austrian desire to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina and Russian ambitions in the neighborhood of Constantinople on a basis of friendly reciprocity.<sup>4</sup>

Aehrenthal did not immediately reply to this dispatch. Events in Southeastern Europe and elsewhere seemed to have forced his hand. First of all was the fear that the Young Turks, recently successful in their rebellion, would invite the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina to elect delegates to the Turkish Parliament. Secondly, there was increasing Pan-Serb agitation in the occupied provinces. Lastly, the recent meeting between the Tsar and the King of England at Reval had inspired fear of encirclement in both Germany and the

<sup>2</sup>Bernadotte Schmitt, *The Annexation of Bosnia*, p. 9; René Pinon, "L'Europe et la crise balkanique" in *Revue Des Deux Mondes*, VI, 1908, p. 864; and *Die Grosse Politik*, XXVI, 1, No. 8923.

<sup>3</sup>*Osterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik, von der bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914*, I, No. 16, hereinafter cited as *Austrian Documents*.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, I, No. 9.



Dual Monarchy.<sup>5</sup> Aehrenthal felt that if Austria-Hungary and Germany now failed to make concessions to Russia, England and France would do so. This would complete the encirclement of the Central powers. After having discussed this matter with Conrad, he decided to try to make an agreement with Russia.<sup>6</sup>

Inspired stories appeared in the Vienna papers discussing the possibility of a visit to Vienna by the Russian Foreign Minister, and Aehrenthal sent a telegram to his ambassador at St. Petersburg, Count Berchtold, instructing him to tell Isvolsky that Aehrenthal would welcome the opportunity to meet with him. Count Berchtold completed the arrangements for a meeting to be held at his castle near Buchlau.<sup>7</sup>

The meeting took place on September 16, 1908, and after considerable discussion, the two Foreign ministers reached, or appeared to reach, certain agreements on Balkan affairs. Within a fortnight, however, what had seemed to be an agreement which was all sweetness and light had turned into a flaming row which almost precipitated a general European War.

What actually did happen at Buchlau? What agreements, if any, were really reached? These questions have plagued both politicians and historians; but to this day, we do not know the whole story. Enough is now known to indicate that neither of the generally held interpretations is satisfactory. One of these maintains that Isvolsky was tricked by Aehrenthal. Later when some of the diplomatic papers became available, many historians were led to the conclusion that Isvolsky had not been duped, but that he had hopelessly compromised himself, and, to quote one of his associates in the Russian Cabinet: "He had actually suffered a moral defeat, since the real facts in the case became known and everyone saw clearly that, amidst the hospitality of Buchlau, Isvolsky had played a part in the fable, 'The Fox and the Crow.'"<sup>8</sup> There are probably elements of truth in both positions, but an examination of the evidence now available would indicate that certain reassessments should be made.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, I, No. 12; *Die Grosse Politik*, XXVI, I, No. 8912, 16-17; and *British Documents on the Origin of the War*, V, p. 249, hereinafter cited as *British Documents*.

<sup>6</sup>Conrad von Hotzendorf, *Aus Meiner Deinstzeit*, I, pp. 512-516-530.

<sup>7</sup>Austrian Documents, I, Nos. 15, 16, 31, 41, 69, 73, 76, and 77.

<sup>8</sup>Count Vladimir Kokovtsov, *Out of my Past*, p. 218. See also the two articles in *Fortnightly Review*, vol. 90, pp. 383-401 and pp. 777-789 for the two sides of the Buchlau argument inspired by the participants.

The only available first-hand record of the conversations is an account by Aehrenthal which was published in the Austrian documents. It is undated (one of two undated documents in the first volume) which gives rise to the suspicion that it may have been altered by Aehrenthal to bolster his case. Professor Bernadotte Schmitt reported seeing Isvolsky's correspondence in the Russian archives. But this material has not been published and the Soviet officials reneged on their promise to supply photostats of it to Schmitt.<sup>9</sup> The account, "Concerning the Annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina" by A. Zaiontchkovsky in *Krasny Arkhiv* is almost worthless except for the reproduction of the exchange of letters between Nicholas II and Franz Joseph.<sup>10</sup> For example, Zaiontchkovsky places the Italian Foreign Minister, Tittoni, at the Buchlau conference, which was not the case. He also asserts that Stolypin had prior knowledge of the Buchlau negotiations. This is highly questionable because of the date mentioned (21 September / 4 October) and because of the testimony of Charykov, Russian under-secretary for Foreign Affairs. The latter states in his "Reminiscences of Nicholas II" that Stolypin was never informed of the negotiations until the annexation was announced.<sup>11</sup>

Through the years there have been two great questions asked about the Buchlau agreement. First, was there a definite time fixed at which the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was to take place? Second, was provision made for calling a conference of the powers signatory to the Treaty of Berlin to confirm the agreement?

The Aehrenthal account of the conference shows that an agreement on a *quid pro quo* basis was quickly reached. Russia was to take a benevolent and friendly attitude if Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina. In return for this the Dual Monarchy would assume a similar attitude should Russia find it in her interest to negotiate with Turkey to open the Straits to her warships. It would be understood that this modification of existing rights did not threaten Constantinople, and that the same rights be granted to other states bordering the Black Sea.

It was also agreed to be highly probable that, following the annexation, Bulgaria would declare her independence, and that a definitive union between Greece and Crete would be established. Aehrenthal stated that he heatedly opposed the cession of a single

<sup>9</sup>B. Schmitt, *Op. cit.*, preface.

<sup>10</sup>*Krasny Arkhiv*, X, pp. 41-54.

<sup>11</sup>*Contemporary Review*, vol. 134, pp. 447-49.

kilometer to Serbia as compensation. Isvolsky remarked that any such contemplated revision of the Treaty of Berlin was liable to bring energetic protests from Turkey. Aehrenthal told him that confidential negotiations should be carried on with the Porte and among the Signatory Powers, but that Bosnia-Herzegovina should not be the subject of discussion. The results of these negotiations would then be submitted to a conference, perhaps to the conference of the Ambassadors at Constantinople. Aehrenthal admitted that Isvolsky was not sympathetic with this idea, and in view of his subsequent statements to Schoen, Bertie, and others there is reasonable doubt that he agreed with it. It certainly became a matter of controversy later.

Aehrenthal then stated that Isvolsky asked him when the time of the annexation would be; and that he answered that it would depend on news from Sarajevo and Plevlje. It was highly probable that the annexation would be announced in the early days of October, near to the opening session of the Imperial Delegations. Isvolsky protested that it would be better for him to have the event occur about the middle of October, after he had finished his European journey, so that he could be in St. Petersburg to orient unfavorable Russian opinion.

To this Aehrenthal said he answered that it would be better for him if Isvolsky were in St. Petersburg at the moment of annexation but he could not promise that it might not have already been announced to the Delegations. This is Aehrenthal's account of the Buchlau conversation.<sup>12</sup> It may be safely maintained that Isvolsky left Buchlau uncertain as to the date at which the annexation would be carried out, and as to the method that should be taken to secure the approval of the Signatory Powers to the proposed changes in the Berlin Treaty. Judging by Aehrenthal's account, Isvolsky was no further toward the achievement of his desires in the matter of the Straits than he had been before the Buchlau conversation.

Isvolsky left Buchlau with the intention of visiting the Italian, French, British, and German Foreign Ministers and securing the approval of their governments to the agreements he had made with Aehrenthal. It seems self-evident that had the Russian known that the Austrian minister was going to do what he did, Isvolsky would not have spent ten days vacationing at Lake Tegern.

While he was there, he received a private letter from Aehrenthal

<sup>12</sup>Austrian Documents, I, No. 79.

which no doubt lulled him into a false sense of security and which shows definitely that he had left Buchlau without knowing the date of the proposed annexation. After explaining the attitude of his government on the construction of a railroad through Montenegro, Aehrenthal stated:

Concerning the matter of Bosnia-Herzegovina, I do not have any further information to give you *as to the date at which we will proceed to the annexation of these provinces. You may count on my promise to give you notice of this date ahead of time.* [my italics]<sup>13</sup>

Isvolsky replied that he had prepared and sent to St. Petersburg for the Tsar's approval, an answer to the Austrian *aide-memoire* of 27 August, 1908, on the basis of the Buchlau discussion. He promised to notify Aehrenthal as quickly as possible, if this were approved by Nicholas. He then proceeded to outline his schedule and to notify Aehrenthal to forward any messages for him after the 1 October to the Russian Embassy in Paris.<sup>14</sup>

The contention that Isvolsky left Buchlau with prior knowledge as to when the annexation of the provinces would occur has been built up on the basis of his conversation with the German Foreign Secretary, Schoen, at Berchtesgaden on 26 September, 1908, and on the basis of a footnote in *Die Grosse Politik*.<sup>15</sup> What exactly did Isvolsky say to Schoen? In his report of the conversation to Chancellor von Bulow, Schoen stated:

Herr Isvolsky had the impression that Baron von Aehrenthal, moved more by internal problems than by external affairs, wished to approach as soon as possible the solution of this problem. [annexation] *Without having obtained determinate plans from Aehrenthal, he [Isvolsky] is inclined toward the supposition that the Austro-Hungarian minister would like to lay the plan for the annexation before the impending meeting of the Delegations.* [my italics]

The Russian Minister did not tell Schoen that he expected the annexation on 8 October. In the footnote the editors of the German Collection quote a document out of context and cite a letter from Isvolsky to Aehrenthal as the Russian answer to the Austrian *aide-memoire* of 27 August, 1908. It was actually the answer to another private letter from Aehrenthal to Isvolsky.<sup>16</sup>

Two further indications that Isvolsky was kept in the dark as to

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, I, No. 82.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*, I, No. 86.

<sup>15</sup>*Die Grosse Politik*, XXVI, I, No. 8935 and *Ibid.*, footnote, p. 31.

<sup>16</sup>*Austrian Documents*, I, Nos. 82 and 86, previously cited.

his true intentions by Aehrenthal may be found in a dispatch from von Hintze to Kaiser Wilhelm II reporting that he was told at the Austro-Hungarian Embassy in St. Petersburg that Aehrenthal had spoken to Isvolsky in an indefinite manner about the possibility of annexation;<sup>17</sup> and in Kanner, *Kaiserliche Katastrophenpolitik* in which the author quotes Aehrenthal as having said that he had not informed Isvolsky that the annexation was imminent.<sup>18</sup> Isvolsky's later statements do not vary greatly from the one he made to Schoen and from this it would seem that he did not lie when he claimed he was tricked by his Austrian colleague.

Certainly there is no definite agreement about a European Conference indicated by Aehrenthal's account of the Buchlau conversation. Professor William L. Langer in an article, "Russia, The Straits Question, and the European Powers,"<sup>19</sup> stated that "Both statesmen were agreed that a European conference should be summoned to approve changes in existing treaties."<sup>20</sup> It is doubtful whether the two private letters from Aehrenthal to Bulow which Langer cited really express a willingness to attend a conference. There is no mention of such a conference in the first letter cited and the second letter does not record an obligation to go to a conference as the result of the Buchlau agreement. In the second communication, Aehrenthal did say:

I think that you, respected Count, would join me in the opinion, that should Russia desist from it, it would be an opportune moment to bring the Straits question to an eventual conference. . . . Concerning my opinion of the conference idea, you have already been informed on all points through Szogyenyi. . . . We cannot risk a misunderstanding with the Turks through a protest against a conference. . . . Fortunately the disposition of Tewfik Pasha and the Grand Vizier toward us has not been unfavorable. . . .

Here, as in his account of the Buchlau negotiations, it is hard to pin Aehrenthal down to a precise statement on a conference.<sup>21</sup> Professor Langer also stated that the Austrian obligation is further attested by the letter of Franz Joseph to Nicholas II of 28 January, 1909. This document is reproduced in *Krasny Archiv* and in the Austrian

<sup>17</sup>*Die Grosse Politik*, XXVI, I, No. 9005.

<sup>18</sup>Cited by Schmitt, *Op. cit.*, pp. 62-63, footnote.

<sup>19</sup>*The English Historical Review*, vol. 44, pp. 59-85.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 74.

<sup>21</sup>*Die Grosse Politik*, XXVI, I, Nos. 8934 and 9055, cited by Langer. Latter document quoted.



Documents.<sup>22</sup> A careful check shows that there is no mention of an obligation to attend a conference mentioned in either text.

On the other hand, as we follow Isvolsky in his progress after Buchlau, we note that he remarked to Schoen, "For himself, he would not have the courage to settle all these important questions in a conversation" and that "probably a new conference should be called." Furthermore, Isvolsky was consistent in that in his negotiations in Paris and in London he continually stressed the desirability of a conference.<sup>23</sup> That the Russian Foreign Office was working under the assumption that a conference would be called is borne out by Charykov who told Nicolson on 5 October, 1908, that he was preparing a circular note to the powers suggesting a conference for the modification of the Treaty of Berlin.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, the conclusion would seem to be, that at Buchlau, there was no real agreement in the matter of a European conference.

There is much about Aehrenthal's actions during this period which would lead one to regard all of his acts with suspicion. He was evasive and less than frank in his interview with his ally, Tittoni, at Salzburg, 4 September, 1908. He mentioned the question of Bosnia-Herzegovina only by saying that in 1904, Italy had agreed that Austria-Hungary should possess these provinces; but not a word did he utter about his real intentions in this matter.<sup>25</sup> He was a little more frank on the next day when he told the German Foreign Secretary, Schoen, that the only solution to the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina for Austria was annexation and that he was attempting to reach an understanding on this and other matters with Russia. But again he gave no indication of his immediate intentions.<sup>26</sup> He even addressed a memorandum to the Emperor, Franz Joseph, warning him to keep all knowledge of his annexation plans from Archduke Franz Ferdinand, so that he would not warn the Kaiser of them during his visit to the German army maneuvers.<sup>27</sup>

The long service of Baron von Aehrenthal in Russia aided him in correctly sizing up the European situation in 1908. He knew Russia's weakness; her fear of revolution. He correctly assessed the egoism

<sup>22</sup>*Krasny Arkhiv*, X, pp. 50-51, and *Austrian Documents*, I, No. 935.

<sup>23</sup>*British Documents*, V, Nos. 297, 311, 332, 333, 364, and 372.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, V, No. 303.

<sup>25</sup>*Austrian Documents*, I, No. 67.

<sup>26</sup>*Die Grosse Politik*, XXVI, I, No. 8927.

<sup>27</sup>*Austrian Documents*, I, No. 43.

and ambition of Isvolsky.<sup>28</sup> He was aware of the weakness, ineptitude, and the paralyzing indecision of Nicholas II. Furthermore, the German fear of a policy of encirclement fostered by Great Britain had been aroused by the conferences at Algeciras and Reval. Aehrenthal gambled that Germany would not abandon her only reliable European ally. It was a safe bet. Von Bulow persuaded the Kaiser to countersign a blank check. Armed with this, Aehrenthal duped Isvolsky, humiliated the Russian Empire, and seized from Germany the diplomatic initiative which Bismarck had preserved so jealously. The results of the Buchlau conference paved the way to Sarajevo.

<sup>28</sup>Count Sergius Witte, *Vospominaniya*, II, pp. 448-49.

## Book Reviews

ZIRKLE, CONWAY. *Death of a Science in Russia. The Fate of Genetics as Described in Pravda and Elsewhere.* Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1949. 319 pp. \$3.75.

Here is trustworthy documentation of the events that evoked from the Governing Board of the American Institute of Biological Science the statement that "the contention raised by Lysenko and his 'Michurinists' against genetics does not represent a controversy of two opposing schools of scientific thought. It is in reality a conflict between politics and science. Today the condemned science happens to be genetics. . . . Tomorrow still other sciences may be proscribed." (p. 306)

Professor Zirkle and his aides have spared no labor to present the complete story in English, supplemented by brief, incisive explanations and interpretations. Here stand the sources: translated documents mostly from *Pravda* accompanied by relevant English-language papers. The inside political deals that eventuated in the destruction of Soviet genetics are unknown; Professor Zirkle indicates possible reasons for the policy and quotes surmises by other writers. *Death of a Science in Russia*, however, includes almost no speculation; the record is meticulous and adequate. The naiveté of *Pravda's* reports of the fateful 1948 meetings of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Science indicates that the political authorities could depend absolutely upon popular submission plus ignorance of science—a combination that men of learning never have

defeated save by martyrdom and the post-mortem verdict of history. Genetics in Russia has its martyrs aplenty, and their vindication at home is still postponed. Professor Zirkle has assembled the stories of these martyrs, the stories of the confused, the cowardly, and the cynical sycophants whose contempt for the victorious junta is veiled by language incomprehensible to their ignorant hearers; but this book gilds no lilies.

The translations are vastly more meaningful to the average American because Professor Zirkle's Introduction clarifies the double-talk of Soviet political verbiage. Briefly he explains the Communist habit of personalizing all doctrines and theories: one does not discuss evolution but talks of Darwinism; the merits of the theory of the gene are buried under violent tirades against "Weissmannism," "Mendelism," or "Morganism." Everyone must proclaim his partisanship: the quick are partisans of Michurin and Lysenko; the dead are accused of accepting Mendel, Weissmann, and Morgan. This device precludes scientific observation and evidence. With one pathetic exception, the papers read at the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Science in 1948 presented no evidence and reported no experiments. Instead, they hurled epithets. Zirkle agrees with other non-Soviet geneticists that no verifiable observations or experiments have been published in support of the official Russian dogmas in biology. The paucity of verified data is readily inferred from the translated papers; scientists who

offer verified data need not resort to abuse.

A second explanation clarifies the Soviet "word game." "The object is to separate words from their meanings. The usual method is to make the word contradict itself within a single sentence or in adjacent sentences. If this is done skilfully enough, it ensures that from there on the argument can be followed only by ear." (p. 9) The third verbal trick is the Party's hierarchy of crucial words; the key terms are sanctioned by the Central Committee of the Communist Party or by individuals sanctified by that Committee. "Dialectical materialism" and "practical" are words with abundant magical potency. The vocabulary of invective includes "idealism," "antiscientific," "erroneous," "inadmissible," "formal," "metaphysical," "bourgeois materialism," and in Lysenko's biology, "mathematical," for Lysenko's mathematical limitations are of first- or second-grade schoolboy order. These epithets are just as damning as "capitalistic," "reactionary," or "priestly." As political winds veer and change, the verbal hierarchy is subject to sudden shifts. Armed with these aids to insight, a reader unversed in Communist mysticism and folklore can interpret the translated materials rather adequately.

If only a reviewer could transcend the clichés such as "this is a must" or "no one can afford to miss this"! For Professor Zirkle has documented a major tragedy in history, one fraught with peril for all scientists. If anti-Communist democracies would implement their distrust of Communism by fortifying the position of scientists in their own na-

tions the future would be brighter. Such consolation is precarious. What has happened in Russia to genetics—probably also to other sciences, such as anthropology—can happen anywhere. The ingredients of this witches' brew are independent of Communism; the tragedy comprises such elements as popular mouthing of scientific jargon coupled with ignorance of scientific aims and scientific integrity; political power over scientists and political decision of the validity of scientific theories; and infiltration of scientific and learned professions by persons adept politically and illiterate scientifically. These ingredients of disaster appear also in the United States, not as negligible accidents of democracy, but in sinister potency.

Implicitly though not explicitly, *Death of a Science in Russia* sounds a warning. It shows how dark ages are born, and thereby flashes a caution light in every laboratory or university in which policy-making has slipped from the hands of scientists into the grip of professional administrators and politicians. This is no book for the masses; its full impact requires prior knowledge of scientific methods and findings in biology, especially in genetics. True, "he who runs can read" even with little or no biology, for it is well written; but such readers must take their biology on authority. Acceptance of science on authority is dangerous, for it is rejected in horror when a bigger witch appears. The price of survival for American scientists includes insight into the death of a science in Russia. This book, read in full, not skimming the monotonous Russian obfuscations, servile recantations, or loud-

mouthed bullying, provides precisely that insight.

DOUGLAS G. HARING  
Syracuse University

JASNY, NAUM. *The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR*. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1949. 837 pp. \$7.50.

A profound sickness afflicts Soviet agriculture. The day to day development of the disease is hidden from us by the many barriers that prevent free communication with the people of the U.S.S.R. and scholarly field investigation in it. The existence and the seriousness of the ailment are abundantly evidenced however by the frantic efforts to cure one or another of its symptoms. As early as 1939, the Soviet government revealed the tendency of many farmers to neglect work in the collectivized fields and enacted legislation—still law today in more stringent form—to compel peasants to work in these fields. In late 1946, the same symptom and others came to the surface again and a Council for Collective Farm Affairs was set up to cure them. In early February 1947, Andreev's speech to the Central Committee and the regulation setting up a new inspection system to prevent peasant misrepresentations about production revealed other aspects of this malady. Legislation in 1948 altered the payment system on farms in an effort to spur output. Yet in early 1950, the cancer—for such it seems most appropriate to term it—was still not cured, for Andreev had to be chastised publicly and his whole farm organization program reversed, while a

month later Khrushchev led the campaign to wipe out thousands of small collectives on the ground that they were operating poorly. Persons familiar with Soviet affairs will not be amazed, however, to know that in the face of these events the collective farm system is still hailed as the most advanced and the most progressive in the world. What better example can one find of the Marxist doctrine of the unity of opposites in brisk application?

The nature of the malady and the reasons for it have long been apparent to those scholars concerned with this area. Naum Jasny's contribution in this work has been to bring together the relevant evidence on the development of Soviet agriculture to 1940, subject it to painstaking statistical analysis, and to reinterpret that evidence from the perspective afforded by the passage of time. In the process he has made available in English a veritable treasure-house of materials on Soviet agriculture which should be of inestimable aid to scholars and students alike for many years to come. He has also provided a model demonstration of how patient piecing together of fragmentary evidence enables one to overcome the deliberate obfuscation, distortion, and even falsification of evidence behind which Soviet leaders all too often seek to hide the true state of affairs in their country.

Perhaps the highest tribute paid to the quality of this volume was that given unintentionally by Professor V. Rummyantsev in *Izvestiya* of November 25, 1949. Unable to refute Jasny's conclusions by scholarly presentation of contrary evidence, Rummyantsev relies for the most part upon the argument *ad hominem* and invective. For sub-



stantive argument, he is reduced to such expedients as deliberately confusing grain production with total agricultural production; ignoring the U.S.S.R.'s heavy dependence upon imported non-grain food during World War II; leaving out of account the heavy obligatory deliveries to the government required of collective farms and farmers for which they receive only nominal payment; citing one ambiguous figure, which, if true, was only so in the year following the best—and since never regained—harvest in Soviet history; and quoting a “witty” barb allegedly directed by Kursk peasants at capitalist countries. Ironically enough three months later it was Kursk province which was singled out as the chief victim of the “perversions” in collective farm organization attributed to Andreev’s policy, a policy which until that time had been official.

Jasny’s diagnosis of the ailment may be summarized as follows: The collectivization of Soviet agriculture was imposed on the peasantry from above in brutal and stupid fashion with consequent great losses of productive capital. To finance its rapid industrialization program of the 1930’s the state had to maintain constant heavy pressure upon the new farms to give up large amounts of food and raw materials while it gave relatively little in return. Under these circumstances per capita income of collective farmers was extremely low so that many of them could earn much more by intensive cultivation of their own small plots than they could from work on the collectivized acres. Ignorance of the detailed complexity of agricultural conditions at the top of the Soviet hierarchy resulted in lopsided mechanization which fell far short of

hoped for goals in increased productivity. Inequality of income in the rural population was actually higher in the late 1930’s than before collectivization, an army of administrative officials and technicians replacing the old *kulaki*, while the situation of the rank and file of the peasantry worsened both absolutely and relatively. The real gains achieved, such as the increased output of cotton, were relatively few and hardly compensate for the high human and other costs incurred. Against this background, the plethora of postwar Soviet complaints about violations of collective farm statutes, denunciations of poor quality work, and the frantic search for solutions through new and ever more complex incentive systems or through basic reorganizations of the collective farm system itself become quite understandable. And it is understandable, too, that so long as the Soviet régime continues to deprive the peasantry of large “surpluses” without adequate recompense its search for final solutions will be in vain.

In a book of such size, scope, and complexity, minor errors are inevitable, though this reviewer has noted none that invalidate basic conclusions. One wonders whether Dr. Jasny has given adequate emphasis to the more positive aspects of change in the Soviet countryside over the past several decades: the increase of literacy, greater availability of medical care, etc. He might have thrown more light than he has on the relationship between collectivization and the ability of the U.S.S.R. to carry on its masterful war effort during 1941–45; in exposing the weakness and heavy cost of the Soviet agricultural revolution, Dr. Jasny has

not always avoided giving his reader an overall impression that may lead to unwarranted deprecation of the present and future power of the U.S.S.R. He implies on p. 543 that he is aware of the pioneer research efforts in this field of such workers as Timoshenko, Ross, Volin, and others, but leaves the nature and extent of his debt to them—if any—unclear.

Other comparatively minor criticisms of this volume could be made, but they all pale beside the paramount fact that Dr. Jasny has exposed the anatomy and pathology of Soviet agriculture with a completeness and detail never before approached. No serious student of the social science aspects of contemporary Soviet society can afford to be unacquainted with this work. The Food Research Institute and the Rockefeller Foundation are to be congratulated for having made this important study possible.

HARRY SCHWARTZ

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GSOVSKI, VLADIMIR. *Soviet Civil Law. Private Rights and Their Background Under the Soviet Regime. Comparative Survey and Translation of the Civil Code; Code of Domestic Relations; Judiciary Act; Code of Civil Procedure; Laws on Nationality, Corporations, Patents, Copyright, Collective Farms, Labor; and Other Related Laws.* Vol. I, "Comparative Survey." Vol. II, "Translation." *Michigan Legal Studies.* Ann Arbor; University of Michigan Press, 1949. 909 pp. \$15.00. The lengthy title of Dr. Gsov-

ski's study is given in full above to emphasize the fact that here is a work to which the standard cliché, "a veritable treasure house of material" is properly applicable. What is more, thanks to an excellent index, it is a highly usable treasure. Nor is its usefulness at all confined to specialists in law and in jurisprudence. Any serious student of Soviet affairs will find this study highly valuable not only for the translated material which it makes conveniently available, but also and equally for Dr. Gsovski's commentaries. This dual usefulness did not come about by chance. His stated purposes included: the supplying of reliable information on Soviet laws, the delineation "of characteristic features of the régime," and an examination of "the fate under the Soviet régime of the legal concepts thus far operative in all civilized societies." (*Preface*, I, xiii, xiv)

The first of these purposes has been met mainly (but not exclusively) by extended quotations from Soviet sources including, of course, the major legal codes. These translations, though originally made from earlier editions, have been brought into accord with the official editions published in 1948. As to recently and currently enacted legislation, Gsovski's study (with a few exceptions) does not go beyond the first six months of 1947.

The second purpose has been fulfilled by a succinct, general survey which covers political, economic, legal and juridical developments and situations; and by commentaries and annotations. The survey, running to some 270 pages, forms the first part of Volume I. Part II of that volume ("Special Topics")

deals with private rights, contracts, torts, inheritance, property, courts, appeals, agrarian and collective farm legislation, etc., etc. The material on agrarian legislation is introduced by an historical summary of pre-Soviet agrarian laws. The third purpose has been achieved largely through pertinent, running commentary and through the device of presenting the evidence from which a reader may draw his own conclusions.

Mention should also be made of the smoothness of Dr. Gsovski's translations. His material is highly readable partly, at least, because he has skillfully translated meanings and sense rather than words. And he has avoided the temptation which seems to beset most of us of only transliterating and not translating certain terms. One reads, therefore, of "collective farms," not of "kolkhossy," and so on. Only very rarely does an exception to this rule appear. It is a performance which might well be emulated by all translators.

*Soviet Civil Law* is by its very nature (at least for non-legalists) a reference work rather than one to be read from cover to cover, although the survey sections can be very profitable reading even for non-specialists. The reviewer can attest from his own experience and from that of some of his students that Dr. Gsovski's study is both easy and rewarding to use for checking many and varied points. It should be in every library which serves students of Russian and Soviet affairs.

WARREN B. WALSH  
*Syracuse University*

RADKEY, OLIVER H. *The Election to the Russian Constituent Assembly of 1917*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950. Harvard Historical Monograph Number XXI. 89 pp. \$2.50.

In this excellent monograph, Dr. Radkey has given us as near the definitive account of this, the only democratic election in Russian experience, as we are likely to get in the foreseeable future. The materials herein presented are based upon careful research in the Soviet Union and in the collections in Western Europe and at Harvard and Stanford. This study improves upon the statistics published in the three previous studies of this election and prints returns from at least three districts which were previously unknown. Of especial value is the appended table of election returns by district which is the most complete and accurate of any in existence.

Several important generalizations can be made from the election results. First, the election held three weeks after the Bolshevik coup d'état certainly did not show popular approval of this action. Secondly, the results show that more than four-fifths of the voters preferred some form of socialism. The complete bankruptcy of the "right" in its appeal to the Russian people in 1917 is convincingly demonstrated. The figures also reveal the bankruptcy of Great Russian nationalism, and of monarchism and clericalism. Among some of the ethnic groups, notably the Ukrainians and the Mohammedan peoples, separatism or particularism is more noticeable.

The analysis of the returns from representative districts shows that

areas subjected to the influence of urban workers or of soldiers from the front were strongly Bolshevik. Black Earth regions, where farming predominated, were just as strongly Social Revolutionary in sentiment. An interesting difference is noted when the results of the vote on the North-Western Front are compared with those from the Roumanian Front, which was fairly well insulated from Petrograd and Bolshevik contagion. In the first, the Bolsheviks won 6 to 1, but the vote was almost exactly reversed in favor of the Social Revolutionaries in the second.

Dr. Radkey uses two criteria of validity: "How free was the vote?" and "Did the people know what they were doing?" After examining the Russian provincial press, he concludes that on the basis of his evidence, the vast majority of the voters acted freely and without prodding. There was very little violence, and the author states that more people have been slain in an ordinary Kentucky election. It is harder to apply the second criterion, but certainly it is true that the great mass of the Russian peasantry voted for those whom they thought would give them the land. Most vocal of the protestants on this second score were Cadets, Monarchists, and landowners who had no following and whom events had left far in the rear of actuality.

While the election led to an Assembly that was violently aborted by Lenin and his Bolsheviks, it is interesting to note that Vladimir Illich made a thorough and careful study of its results to be used for the future education of his Party.

KENNETH I. DAILEY  
Syracuse, N. Y.

BAILEY, THOMAS A. *America Faces Russia. Russian-American Relations from Early Times to Our Day.* Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press, 1950. 375 pp. \$4.00.

The latest book on Russian-American relations "from early times to our day" has made its debut and belongs to the pen of Professor Thomas A. Bailey of Stanford University. That there is a need for such a book, especially today, is more than obvious, yet one cannot conclude, after carefully reading it, that Professor Bailey's work fills the gap; the saga of the Russian-American relations still remains to be written.

Professor Bailey is apparently making the assumption that "really friendly" relations between two great countries must be always uninterrupted and what is more, absolutely devoid of selfish interests. Such idyllic relations between great powers are unknown.

That the relations between the United States and Soviet Russia have never been friendly is an established fact, but to claim that "Czarism was about as antipathetic ideologically to democracy as is present-day Stalinism," is overstressing it. The surprising fact is that, despite the difference in ideologies, the relations between the two countries, for a span of almost a century and a half were as friendly as they were. This observation, Professor Bailey carefully avoids. And yet it seems important to know that these two great countries for 141 years (from 1776 to 1917) never fought, never broke diplomatic relations, and never really seriously clashed. Can any other two great powers produce such a record? It is of course true, that Russia and the United States had disagreements,

resorted to diplomatic pin-pricks, even remonstrated with each other officially and non-officially, yet, on the whole, their relations remained friendly.

Professor Bailey's main object, apparently, in dealing with relations up to 1917, is to prove that the friendship between the two countries did not exist, that it was a legend. It is sufficient to glance over the titles of his chapters, to illustrate his attitude: "The Legend of the Cordial Catherine"; "The Era of the Amiable Alexander" ("cordial" and "amiable" are used, of course, ironically); "A Muscovite Menace"; "Rifts in Friendship"; "The Russian Fleet Myth," etc.

Despite these "menacing" titles, several of his chapters seem to disprove his thesis. While Professor Bailey emphasizes almost every "unpleasant" situation and discusses it in detail, he carefully avoids facts that would undermine his thesis. For instance, the very friendly reception given to the Grand Duke Alexis in 1871-72 by the American people, hardly rates a few lines. The assassination of Emperor Alexander II in 1881, had profoundly shocked this country, as could be judged from the contemporary American press, yet Professor Bailey, even in this case, claims that "the rank and file American . . . looked upon [it] . . . as an incident in progress." All mention of the visit of the Russian Fleet to New York in 1893 and the warm reception given to the Russians by the American people is omitted altogether. Nothing is said (even in a footnote) about the return visit of the American Fleet to Kronstadt in 1911 (the year when Russian-American relations certainly were not at their best) and the

very friendly reception extended to Americans by the Russian population. It is curious, too, that the author does not mention that Tolstoy thought the George Kennan story about Siberian exile was exaggerated (see Andrew White's *Memoirs*).

The author's conclusion that "Czarism in the nineteenth century was a menace not only to Europe but at times to us," seems unconvincing to this reviewer and not substantiated by facts. Happily, it is not the general belief.

Paradoxical as it may seem, Russian-American friendship began with the birth of the American Republic and ended with the death of "Tsarism." There is always hope that this friendship may be "resurrected." Professor Bailey concludes: "we can hardly hope to achieve an enduring peace unless the present techniques and ultimate aims of Russian Communism are substantially modified." In this, no doubt, he is right.

ALEXANDER TARSAIDZE  
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TURKEVICH, LUDMILLA BOUKETOFF.  
*Cervantes in Russia*. Princeton,  
Princeton University Press, 1950.  
255 pp. \$4.00.

Since Russia first began to concern itself dimly with Spanish literature, in the reign of Catherine the Great, Cervantes' *Don Quixote* has become an ever more interesting figure to the Russian intelligentsia. The popularity of the work is attested to by the fact that thirty-four more or less complete editions of the novel have appeared between 1769 and 1940, and some thirty-



nine children's versions of the same. Few of the translations were good, and few of the critics dealt with the novel in esthetic terms or in terms of its own inner structure and relation to the Spanish spirit. The real secret of the fascination of the hero lay in the fact that the Russian intelligentsia felt that the Knight of the Melancholy Countenance was the archetype of their own impractical dreaming and chivalrous endeavor, frustrated by the incongruous realities of the world in which they themselves lived. They never seem to have gotten interested in his inseparable companion, Sancho Panza, and only the Symbolists found any significance in Dulcinea.

With Lunacharsky, Soviet literature and criticism continued this sense of identity. For him the time had come when Don Quixote's chivalric dreams might at last become reality. Later Soviet critics explained him, or explained him away, in terms of class clichés. Finally, he was "purged" in a world which finds no room for the impractical dreamer but only for the "practical" *udarnik-bogatyr-commissar* hero "of unchallengeable ideas in an environment that in the end inevitably yields to him."

This biography of Don Quixote and Cervantes in Russia is traced in detail by Ludmilla Buketoff Turkevich in a work which, for the sake of completeness, omits no mention of the Don even by writers to whom he is only a name dimly heard at second or third hand. As the interest of the Russian intelligentsia for Don Quixote grows, the study, too, grows in interest. But at no point does the reader quite feel the incandescence which should arise from the contact between the flame of Russian liter-

ature and the flame of Don Quixote's bright spirit. Still, every student will be grateful for the completeness, and every Cervantist for the flashes of understanding that are struck from the too sober study in the closing chapters.

BERTRAM D. WOLFE  
Columbia University

FUELOEP-MILLER, RENÉ. *Fyodor Dostoevsky: Insight, Faith, and Prophecy*. New York and London, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950. 137 pp. \$2.00.

This is a penetrating interpretation of the great Russian novelist and thinker by a distinguished European, now American, writer and philosopher. A close student of Dostoevsky, Mr. Fueloep-Miller discovered and brought out extensive unpublished writings of Dostoevsky and edited the private notebooks of Dostoevsky's wife.

The present volume fixes the attention on the essential aspects of the Russian writer, as artist, psychologist, and religious thinker. Part I is devoted to a sympathetic and perceptive account of Dostoevsky's life, which is closely related to his creative work. "All the problems that beset the heroes of his [Dostoevsky's] novels," the author observes, "—the ultimate mystery of existence, the coming to grief of the guilty and innocent, blind chance and higher destiny—the problems take on a profounder, more dramatic significance when we see them in the light of this extraordinary life." Dostoevsky, as the author justly points out, had a genius for transmuting his experiences into art (his exile, his poverty,

his passion for gambling, his epilepsy) and his hardships and distress turned out to be veritable blessings for his literary activity.

Part II is concerned with Dostoevsky's significance for our times. It discusses his place in modern fiction, evaluates his rôle as a forerunner of psychoanalysis, and analyses his prophecies. As a novelist, Mr. Fueloep-Miller shows how Dostoevsky's concept of reality "rounded out the nineteenth century realistic art, and at the same time opened new roads for the modern novel; it foreshadowed the psychological, expressionistic, surrealist, and fantasio-realistic techniques." As a psychologist, long before Freud, Dostoevsky discovered the basic tenets of psychoanalysis and dream interpretation, anticipated even Adler's individual psychology. Finally, Dos-

toevsky's many and extraordinarily detailed prophecies of the oncoming of the totalitarian state with all its implications, were confirmed in our own time. Some prophecies, like the one on Russia's future Christian mission, remain unfulfilled. Yet, Dostoevsky was right, the author points out, in assigning *a crucial rôle* to Russia in the coming world, and he described with uncanny accuracy the mentality of Bolshevism.

Mr. Fueloep-Miller finds that Dostoevsky, like Kierkegaard, has a special significance for us today. Both conquered rationalistic doubt and turned "to God through Christ." "Both men must be counted among those great preachers of religious rebirth to whom we in this troubled age turn with hope."

DIMITRI VON MOHRENSCHILDT  
*Dartmouth College*

## BOOK NOTICES

ALPATOV, MIKHAIL. *Russian Impact on Art*. Ed. with Pref. by M. L. Wolf; trans. by Ivy Litvinov. New York, Philosophical Library. 1950. 352 pp. \$7.50.

The author is a Soviet specialist on the history of art, particularly Byzantine and Russian art. This book is a popular account of Russia's place in the history of world art. It covers architecture, painting, sculpture, peasant art and, briefly, a few landmarks of literature and music. The author's aim is to bring out "the original and individual contributions made by Russian artists to the world treasury." The major conclusion reached is that while Russian cultural development in the main followed the lines of Western, humanistic tradition, Russian culture is different from that of Western Europe (by implication, is superior to it), because Russia "from the ancient times has been opposed to the excessive manifestations of West-European individualism." It had always "a broad peasant national base unknown to the other cultures of Europe." The general tone of the book is highly patriotic, and there is a tendency to exaggerate Russian achievements in painting, sculpture and certain branches of the peasant art. Alpatov's volume is, however, quite a readable and useful survey of Russia's artistic growth.

HOFF, T. J. B. *Economic Calculation in the Socialist Society*. William Hodge and Company, Limited, 1949.

This book was published originally in Norwegian in 1938. The present work "except for a few

minor corrections" is identical with the original edition. It is a systematic analysis of the feasibility of applying economic calculations to such matters as selling prices of consumer's goods, intermediate goods, and raw materials; and the feasibility of rational allocation of resources in a socialist state.

The notion that a socialist state could be operated without a price system is quickly exploded, for unless all natural resources, including labor effort, were free, the planners would have no inkling as to what should be produced or how it should be produced. The second major problem arises if one assumes that consumers are guided by price relations, whether or not the prices are fixed, or competitively determined. Here Mr. Hoff examines the difficulties of pricing and allocating the factors of production, and reserves and profit determination.

On the whole, the book is closely reasoned and provides much useful information for the advanced student in economics as well as the layman.

SHAPIRO, LEONARD (Compiler and editor.) *Soviet Treaty Series. A Collection of Bilateral Treaties, Agreements and Conventions, etc., Concluded Between the Soviet Union and Foreign Powers*. Volume I, 1917—1928. Washington, D. C., Georgetown University Press, 1950. 406 pp.

First volume of a projected series "which will present every bilateral diplomatic instrument to which the Soviet government has become a party since 1917." Translations have been carefully and skillfully

done, and the texts have been collated when possible. A few of the documents are given in summary form, and certain items "of great detail and relative insignificance have also been deleted." Tariff schedules are among the technical details sometimes omitted. Three hundred and fifteen agreements are listed in the body of the work, including some which are given by title only because the texts are not available. Seven "alleged secret treaties" are printed as an appendix.

Documents are arranged in chronological order. Dr. Shapiro has supplied three guides to facilitate research and use: a full chronological listing, an index by signatories, and an index by subjects. All three have been prepared with care and are genuinely useful.

The collection is a most valuable addition to our sources about the U.S.S.R. This volume should be in every library which supports work in the fields of European history and international relations as well, of course, as the study of Russia and the Soviet Union.

SPECTOR, IVAR. *Soviet Strength and Strategy in Asia*. Seattle, Superior Publishing Co., 1950. 57 pp.

A reprinting and amplification of a series of newspaper articles by the former editor of *Soviet Press Translations*. The material, based largely upon items which have appeared in the Soviet press, is presented in eleven brief (three to five pages), popularly-written "chapters." Dr. Spector's interpretations are usually fresh and interesting. They are often controversial. There are four pages of cartoons from *Krokodil*.

*The Ukrainian Quarterly*. Editor-in-Chief, Nicholas D. Chubaty. Published by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America. Managing office: Rm. 252, 50 Church St., New York 7, N. Y. \$5.00 a year; single copies, \$1.25.

A journal devoted to the publication of articles and reviews expressing the viewpoint of Ukrainian nationalists. Of similar purpose, and published from the same address (although by a different group) is the semi-monthly, *Ukrainian Bulletin*. The *Quarterly* is now in its sixth volume; the *Bulletin*, in its third. Current issues of both periodicals feature attacks on what is regarded as the intolerable pro-Great Russianism of Mr. George Kennan. Both articles recommend the appointment of Mr. James Burnham as top U.S. advisor on Russian affairs.

WALSH, WARREN B. *Readings in Russian History*. Enlarged edition. Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1950. 638 pp. \$5.00.

Materials originally published in 1948 are here completely reprinted together with a supplement of about ninety pages of additional selections. Of the new material—forty-odd items—most are from Russian sources and over half are translations which have not been hitherto available. All but a few of the selections are primary sources. The original edition ranged from the early Slavs through the February-March Revolution. The Supplement concentrates on the Soviet period. The editorial introductions to each selection serve to identify the source and sketch an outline of Russian and Soviet history.

## NEW BOOKS RECEIVED

- ARAKELIAN, A. *Industrial Management in the USSR*. Washington, D. C., Public Affairs Press, 1950, 168 pp. \$3.00.
- AVILOV, LYDIA. *Chekhov in My Life*. Trsl. by David Magarshack. New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1950, 159 pp. \$2.75.
- BERG, L. S. *Natural Regions of the USSR*. New York, Macmillan, 1950. \$10.00.
- BISHOP, DONALD G. *Soviet Foreign Relations. A Book of Documents and Readings*. Syracuse, N. Y., Syracuse University Press, 1950. 190 pp. \$5.00.
- BODDE, DERK. *Tolstoy and China*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1950. 110 pp. \$2.50.
- BORSCHAK, ELIE. *La legende historique de l'Ukraine*. Paris, Institut d'Etudes Slaves, 1949. 195 pp.
- CARMAN, ERNEST D. *Soviet Imperialism*. Washington, D. C., Public Affairs Press, 1950. 175 pp. \$3.25.
- DOROSH, JOHN T. (Compiler). *Guide to Soviet Bibliographies. A Selected List of References*. The Library of Congress, General Reference and Bibliography Division. Washington: Library of Congress, 1950. 158 pp. \$1.05.
- ENTWHISTLE, W. J. and MORISON, W. A. *Russian and the Slavonic Languages*. New York, Macmillan, 1949. \$7.50.
- FEUILLADE, L. and LAZAREVITCH, N. *Tu peux tuer cet homme. Scenes de la vie revolutionnaire russe*. Paris, Libraire Gallimard, 1950. 262 pp. 330 fr.
- HARPER, S. N. and THOMPSON, RONALD. *The Government of the Soviet Union*. 2nd Ed. New York, D. Van Nostrand, 1950. 369 pp.
- INKELES, ALEX. *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950. 379 pp. \$5.00.
- JAKOBSON, R. and SIMMONS, E. J. (Eds). *Russian Epic Studies*. (Vol. 42 in the *Memoirs of the American Folklore Society*). Philadelphia, American Folklore Society, 1949. 224 pp. \$4.50.
- JOHNSON, WILLIAM H. E. *Russia's Educational Heritage*. New Brunswick, N. J., Rutgers University Press, 1950. 350 pp. \$5.00.
- KASENKINA, OKSANA. *Leap to Freedom*. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Co., 1949. 295 pp. \$3.00.
- LASERSON, MAX M. *The American Impact on Russia, 1784-1917*. New York, Macmillan, 1950. 442 pp. \$5.00.



- LEONTOVITSCH, VICTOR. *Die Rechtsumwälzung unter Iwan dem Schrecklichen*. Stuttgart, Germany. K. F. Koehler Verlag, 1947. 134 pp.
- MILLER, HUGH. *The Community of Man*. New York, Macmillan, 1949. 169 pp. \$3.00.
- MOORE, BARRINGTON (JR.). *Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950. 503 pp. \$6.00.
- SCHULTZE, BERNARD. *Russische Denker*. Vienna, Thomas Morus Press, 1950. 456 pp.
- SEGER, ELIZABETH. *The Pageant of Russian History*. New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1950. 433 pp. \$4.50.
- SMITH, WALTER BEDELL. *My Three Years in Moscow*. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Co., 1950. 346 pp. \$3.75.
- STOCKI, ROMAN SMAL. *Slavs and Teutons. The Oldest Germanic-Slavic Relations*. Milwaukee, The Bruce Publishing Co., 1950. 108 pp.
- SWARUP, R. *Russian Imperialism—How to Stop it?* Calcutta, Prachi Prakashan, 1950, 56 pp. Rs. 2/-.
- THOMPSON, CRAIG. *The Police State*. New York, E. P. Dutton and Co., 1950. 257 pp. \$3.00.
- WHITE, JOHN A. *The Siberian Intervention*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1950. 471 pp. \$6.00.

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